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Preface 
This report was prepared in the context of the three-year research project on European 
Innovation Policies for the Digital Shift (EURIPIDIS) jointly launched in 2013 by JRC-IPTS 
and DG CONNECT of the European Commission in order to improve understanding of 
innovation in the ICT sector and of ICT-enabled innovation in the rest of the economy.1  
The purpose of the EURIPIDIS project is to provide evidence-based support to the 
policies, instruments and measurement needs of DG CONNECT for enhancing ICT 
Innovation in Europe, in the context of the Digital Agenda for Europe and of the ICT 
priority of Horizon 2020. It focuses on the improvement of the transfer of best research 
ideas to the market.   
EURIPIDIS aims are: 
1 to better understand how ICT innovation works, at the level of actors such as firms, 
and also of the ICT “innovation system” in the EU; 
2 to assess the EU's current ICT innovation performance, by attempting to measure ICT 
innovation in Europe and measuring the impact of existing policies and instruments 
(such as FP7 and Horizon 2020); and  
3 to explore and suggest how policy makers could make ICT innovation in the EU work 
better. 
This report describes the methodology used to develop a comprehensive dataset, 
denominated INNOREG, which provides information on several potential drivers and 
barriers to firms’ innovation activity, related to labour market regulation, generosity of 
the tax treatment for R&D and indices of the “ease” of doing business. The report also 
provides summary statistics on the three types of measures mentioned above.  
1  For more information, see the project web site: 
http://is.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pages/ISG/EURIPIDIS/EURIPIDIS.index.html
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Abstract 
The purpose of this report is to describe the methodology used to develop a 
comprehensive dataset, denominated INNOREG, which provides information on several 
potential drivers and barriers to firms’ innovation activity. All the examined drivers and 
barriers depend, in a more or less direct way, upon the decisions taken by national policy 
makers. By merging INNOREG with data on ICT use, innovation, productivity and 
employment it will be possible to investigate the effect of several policies (mainly 
concerning labour market and taxation) and of the efficiency of bureaucracy on measures 
of economic performance such as production, employment, innovation etc..     
The data are of three main types: 
1. reforms of labour market regulation, computed using the EU Commission 
LABREF database, and which gives us information on the direction and 
intensity of reforms affecting the labour markets of  27 EU countries from 
2000 to 2012  (LABREF_DRF.DTA); 
2. generosity of the tax treatment for R&D, as measured by the B-Index over 
the period 1990-2013 (not all years are available) for a set of EU countries  
(B_INDEX.DTA); 
3. indices of business regulation, as measured by various indicators taken by the 
Wordbank DoingBusiness project, reported annually from 2004 to 2014 for all 
EU countries (DOINGBUSINESS.DTA).   
For each of the above three topics, we developed a specific dataset (name in 
parenthesis). The three resulting datasets were then merged to form the comprehensive 
INNOREG dataset (INNOREG.dta).  
In this report we also provide summary statistics on the three types of data mentioned 
above.  
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1.  Introduction and motivation  
Improvements in efficiency of production (or “multi-factor productivity”) are among the 
main drivers of economic growth. Governments can shape firms’ innovation activity and 
the diffusion of new production techniques and, as a consequence, firms’ productive 
efficiency through several channels: the regulation of product and labour markets, fiscal 
rules, direct funding on R&D, bureaucracy efficiency, etc.  
As a consequence, market regulation affects not only the wellbeing of consumers, 
producers and workers, but also the size of the economy and the resources available to 
the whole population.  
The OECD (2002) provides evidence of persistent differences between countries in both 
economic performance and regulatory patterns. The study concludes that “easing product 
market regulation and employment protection positively affects multi-factor productivity 
levels and technological catch-up by raising the incentives to improve efficiency and 
lowering the costs of doing so”. According to European Commission (2004) and Bassanini 
and Ernst (2002) the effect of easing product market regulation is clear: it positively 
affects multi-factor productivity levels, technological catch-up and the innovative efforts 
of firms. Concerning job market protection, however, its effects are mixed: while 
reducing job market protection might  positively affect multi-factor productivity (by 
means of within-firm productivity gains or through the reallocation of output to more 
efficient firms), easing hiring and firing rules has an ambiguous effect on the R&D 
activities leading to innovation. Indeed on the one hand, innovation activity may require 
a change in the optimal skills mix and, as a consequence, it may benefit from easier (and 
less costly) worker turnover. On the other hand, if the new skills mix can be achieved by 
providing training to the existing workforce, more flexible rules on hiring and firing 
workers may not have any impact on innovation activity. 
A further tool which is increasingly used by governments to leverage business R&D are 
fiscal incentives.2 The main advantage of using these indirect incentives is that they are 
market-based non-discriminatory tools, they reduce the marginal costs of R&D activities, 
enhance the attractiveness for foreign investments in R&D activities, and increase 
company cash flows by reducing operating costs (OECD, 2011).  A potential downside is 
the tax competition across countries triggered by massive use of these fiscal incentives 
and also the fact that the costs of tax credits, in terms of foregone earnings, do not 
usually appear as R&D support in government budgets. 
Finally, the regulatory environment as a whole, the efficiency of bureaucracy and 
administrative complexity, all affect entry into the market of new potentially innovative 
enterprises, access to credit for both incumbents and entrants, and, in general, the 
productivity of the economic system.   
In order to take account of all these potential drivers and barriers to firms’ innovation we 
have developed a comprehensive dataset called INNOREG. This dataset gathers 
information on policies which affect labour markets, fiscal rules and the “ease” of doing 
business which, according to the literature, can in turn affect firms’ innovation activity. 
In this report we describe the methodology followed to create the dataset and the main 
features of INNOREG.  
  
                                           
2
  The role played by fiscal incentives in driving firms’ R&D in Europe has been recognized and 
analyzed by two expert groups at the European Commission: the 2005 CREST OMC Working 
Group on Evaluation and Design of R&D Tax Incentives, and the 2008 Expert Group on R&D Tax 
Incentive Evaluation (European Commission, DG Research, 2009). 
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2.  The INNOREG dataset 
We developed a comprehensive dataset, denominated INNOREG, which provides 
information on several potential drivers and barriers to firms’ innovation activity. All the 
examined drivers and barriers depend, in a more or less direct way, upon the decisions 
taken by national policy makers. By merging INNOREG with data on ICT use, innovation, 
productivity and employment it will be possible to investigate the effect of several 
policies (mainly concerning labour market and taxation) and of the efficiency of 
bureaucracy on the overall efficiency of production, innovation, labour productivity and 
employment.     
The data are of three main types: 
1. reforms of labour market regulation (LABREF_DRF.DTA); 
2. generosity of the tax treatment for R&D (B_INDEX.DTA); 
3. indices of the ease of doing business (DOINGBUSINESS.DTA).   
For each of the above three topics, we developed a specific dataset (name in 
parenthesis). The three resulting datasets were then merged to form the comprehensive 
INNOREG dataset (INNOREG.dta).  
Most of the work was devoted to developing the indices in 1. For the other two, we took 
advantage of existing published databases that we cleaned and re-organized in order to 
obtain easily interpretable indicators that can be immediately used for the specific 
purposes.  
2.1  Data on labour market reforms 
 
To build a panel of indices of labour market regulation for all EU countries, we identified 
two main potential sources of data: 
1) The FRdB-IZA Social Reforms database (new release). 
2) The LABREF.  
In the following paragraphs, we briefly describe both datasets, their main advantages 
and drawbacks and the motivation for choosing to rely on LABREF. 
2.1.1  FRdB-IZA Social Reforms Database 
The aim of this database is to provide qualitative information, with a comparative 
perspective, about core labour market reforms in a number of European countries.  
The database covers, at the time of writing, 14 European Union Countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) for the time interval 1980 - 2007.  
Reforms are classified in two broad policy areas: 
 Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) 
 Non-Employment Benefits (NEB) 
Each reform is then classified according to the specific topic covered. Both areas include 
several topics which help users to aggregate reforms in several ways. Overall, there are 
50 topics (Table 1). 
A positive or negative sign is then attributed to each reform. For the EPL area reforms, a 
measure has a positive sign if it increases the flexibility of the system (in particular, if it 
makes the dismissal of workers easier or cheaper). For the reforms in the NEB area, 
measures have a positive sign if they increase the rewards from labour market 
participation (i.e. if they reduce the amount or the duration of non-employment benefits, 
or if they make eligibility conditions stricter).  
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Main advantage of the FRdB-IZA Social Reforms Database: 
 Long period covered (27 years). 
Main drawback of the FRdB-IZA Social Reforms Database: 
 Only 14 EU countries out of the current 28. 
Table 1: Topics covered by FRdB-IZA Social Reforms database by policy area 
 
EMPLOYMENT AND PROTECTION 
LEGISLATION  (EPL) 
NON EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS (NEB) 
Apprenticeship ALMP - Duty to seek for a job 
Collective dismissals ALMP - For specific categories 
Duty to inform? ALMP - For unemployed 
Employment rights Contributions 
Fixed-term contracts Disability benefits 
Individual dismissals - Compensation Early retirement 
Individual dismissals - Procedural obligations Earnings disregards 
Individual dismissals - Reasons In-work benefits 
Individual dismissals - Reinstatement Private placement services 
Individual dismissals - Taxes Public employment services 
Interim wages Sickness benefits 
Labour disputes Social assistance 
New types of contract Taxation 
Notice period Unemployment benefits - Benefits 
Part-time contracts Unemployment benefits - Contributions 
Public sector employment Unemployment benefits - Duration 
Restrictions to employment Unemployment benefits - Earnings disregard 
Self-employment Unemployment benefits - Eligibility 
Severance payments Unemployment benefits  For specific categories 
Temporary work Unemployment benefits - Indexation 
Trade union rights Unemployment benefits - Others 
Training contracts Unemployment benefits - Procedural 
obbligations 
Trial period Unemployment benefits - Reference earnings 
 Unemployment benefits - Replacement rate 
 Unemployment benefits - Sanctions 
 Unemployment benefits - Single instalment 
 Unemployment benefits - Taxation 
 
We consider that the disadvantages resulting from partial coverage of EU countries 
(50%) and from the fact that, as of today, the database cover reforms implemented up 
to 2007 exceed the advantages of the longer time period covered by the FRdB-IZA Social 
Reforms Database. For this reason, we have decided to focus on the second available 
database that will be described in greater detail in the following section.  
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2.1.2  LABREF - DG ECFIN and Economic Policy Committee (EPC) 
LABREF is a database of labour market reforms undertaken in the European Union 
(European Commission, 2013). It provides qualitative information on those reforms 
implemented by each Member State which could affect labour market performance. The 
objective of the LABREF database is to help EU policy makers to understand and compare 
the labour market institutions of each EU country, and to enhance economic policy 
coordination3.   
The database covers 27 European Union countries (excluding Croatia) in the period from 
1999 to 2012, though the coverage is only reliable from 2000.  
For each reform, LABREF provides information on several relevant features:  
- general description; 
- reference (budget law, decree, law, etc.); 
- year of adoption (the year when a measure is legally enacted); 
- timing of implementation (which does not necessarily correspond to the year of 
adoption); 
- socio-economic group targeted (e.g. young people); 
- domain of application (new entrants and also incumbents); 
- comprehensiveness (is the measure embedded in a policy programme or is it part 
of a reform package?); 
- information source.    
Reforms are categorized in nine main policy domains. Each area is then subdivided into a 
total of 48 fields4 (Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Fields covered by LABREF database by Policy Domains 
 
POLICY DOMAINS POLICY FIELDS 
1. Active Labour Market Policy Active labour market policies - Other 
Direct job creation schemes 
Employment subsidies 
Public Employment Services (job assistance) 
Special schemes for the disabled 
Special schemes for youth 
Training 
2. Early Withdrawal Disability schemes 
Early retirement 
3. Immigration and Mobility Immigration control 
Internal mobility 
Measure to facilitate labour market integration 
Mobility - Other 
Selective immigration policies 
4. Job Protection Collective dismissals 
Definition of fair dismissal 
                                           
3  For a description of the LABREF database see Turrini et al. (2015). 
4  The fields are 49 but one of them ("Working time -Other") was emply at the time of the 
analysis. 
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POLICY DOMAINS POLICY FIELDS 
Definition of valid reasons for fixed-term contracts 
Maximum duration of fixed-term contract 
Maximum number of renewals of fixed-term contract 
Notice and severance payments 
Permanent contracts - Other 
Procedural requirements 
Temporary agency work 
Temporary contracts – Other 
5. Labour Taxation 
 
Employees' social security contribution 
Employers' social security contribution 
Income tax 
Labour Taxation - Other 
Self-employed peoples’ social security contributions 
6. Other welfare-related benefits 
 
Family-related benefits 
In-work benefits (employment conditional) 
Short time working scheme 
Sickness schemes 
Social assistance (housing, means-tested) 
7. Unemployment benefits 
 
Coverage and eligibility conditions 
Duration of unemployment benefits 
Net replacement rate 
Search and job availability requirement 
Unemployment benefits - Other 
8. Wage Setting 
 
Public wages 
Regulation by the Government of the wag 
Social pacts, bipartite or tripartite framework agreements 
on wage setting 
Statutory Minima 
Wage setting - Other 
9. Working Time 
 
Family-related working-time organisation 
Part-time work 
Sabbatical and other special leave scheme 
Working hours management 
 
Table A1 in the Appendix reports the number of reforms undertaken by each EU country 
during the period 2000-2012, by year of implementation.  
The total number of reforms ranges from a minimum of 48 in Slovenia (with 4 reforms 
per year on average) to a maximum of 182 in Spain (with 14 reforms per year on 
average) (Figure 1). Large countries, especially in Continental (France, Germany) and 
Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain), have implemented more labour 
market reforms, above the EU average (almost 100 reforms) during the analysed period. 
Small Northern economies (Luxemburg, Denmark, Netherlands, Ireland), and EU late 
entrants (Slovenia, Estonia, Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, Latvia) are below the 
average value. 
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Figure 1: Total number of labour market reforms in EU Countries (2000-2012) 
Source: our elaboration on LABREF database 
The intensity of the labour market reform process undertaken in the last decade in 
Southern European countries is not surprising if we consider that, according to the OECD 
Indicator of Employment Protection for 1999 reported in Figure 2, Greece, Italy and 
Portugal were among the five EU countries with the highest degree of employment 
protection5.   
 
Figure 2: OECD Indicator of Employment Protection in 1999 
 
Source: our elaboration on OECD Employment Protection Indicators 2009 
Looking at the temporal dimension, we observe that the number of reforms implemented 
by year (Figure 3) varies considerably. The peak year was 2009, when more than 400 
different measures were implemented across the EU. This intense reforming activity was 
probably a reaction of EU governments to the first signs of the financial and economic 
crisis that had just started.  
  
                                           
5  Among several indices calculated by the OECD, here we present the EPRC_V2 available for the 
period 1998-2013 which is Version 2 of the original OECD indicator. 
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Figure 3: Total number of labour market reforms by year (2000-2012) 
 
Source: our elaboration on LABREF database 
This picture is however incomplete. There were differences in the number and breadth of 
the policy domains affected by some reforms (see Table 2). If reforms affect only a 
limited number of domains and fields, we would expect more limited impact on the 
relevant economic variables. If, however, reforms have a broader scope, we would 
expect larger and more durable effects. Table A2 and A3 (see the Appendix) report, 
respectively, the number of policy domains (out of 9) and fields (out of 48), which have 
had at least one reform by year of implementation and country.   
Figure 4 illustrates the per-year average number of policy domains and policy fields that 
have been affected by at least one reform in each EU country. Cyprus, Slovenia, Estonia 
and Malta, where less than three policy domains were reformed on average per year, are 
the countries that experienced the least “extensive” process of labour market reform. 
Belgium and Spain, where more than five policy domains were reformed are, on the 
other hand, the countries that undertook the broadest reforms of their labour market. As 
expected, there is a positive correlation between the number of reforms implemented 
and the number of policy domains affected by a reform. However Italy, Portugal and 
Greece, which were among the first six countries in terms of number of reforms 
implemented, are ranked respectively 8th, 10th and 12th as regards the number of policy 
domains reformed. On the other hand, countries such as Romania or Bulgaria, which 
were below the EU average as regards the number of reforms undertaken, are now in the 
upper end of the distribution. As expected, again, there is a positive correlation between 
the number of policy domains reformed and the number of specific topics (policy fields) 
addressed by the reforms. Spain is the country that has most deeply changed its labour 
market over the last few years, followed by Belgium. The governments of Bulgaria, Italy 
and Portugal have also intervened in several aspects of labour market regulation. The 
smaller countries (Cyprus, Slovenia, Estonia, Malta, Luxembourg), however, have more 
stable legislative frameworks.    
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Figure 4: Average number of labour policy domains (out of 9) and of policy fields (out of 
48) affected by reforms by country 
Source: our elaboration on LABREF database 
 
LABREF also provides information on the “direction” of each measure. Since reforms can 
be very heterogeneous, the meaning of the term “direction” varies across the nine policy 
areas. Table 3 shows when a reform is classified as “increasing” the underlying policy 
settings by policy area. 
 
Table 3: Direction of the reforms 
POLICY AREA MEANING OF “INCREASING” 
1. Active Labour Market Policy Measures increasing the availability, generosity or 
effectiveness of Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP) 
2. Early Withdrawal Measures increasing the generosity of early withdrawal 
schemes or easing eligibility conditions 
3. Immigration and Mobility Measures tightening regulatory restrictions on migration 
or reducing support to mobility 
4. Job Protection  Measures increasing protection against job dismissal 
5. Labour Taxation Measures increasing the tax burden on labour 
6. Other Welfare-related Benefits Measures increasing the generosity of benefits or easing 
entitlement conditions 
7. Unemployment Benefits Measures increasing the generosity of unemployment 
benefits or easing search and job availability 
requirements 
8. Wage Setting  Measures tightening framework conditions for wage 
setting on the part of employers 
9. Working Time Measures tightening regulatory requirements on working 
time 
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We define as “positive” those reforms which, at least in principle, should enhance job 
market flexibility6. As a result, for us a measure is defined as “positive” if it is classified 
as “Decreasing” by LABREF for all policy domains, with the exception of ALMP (reforms 
increasing the generosity and effectiveness of ALMP). On the other hand, we define as 
“negative” those measures which are expected to tighten the rules applied to labour 
market relations.  During the analysed 12 years (2000-2012), EU countries approved a 
total of 2,703 labour market reforms, of which 64% are classified as “positive” and 32% 
as “negative” in the sense explained above (Table 4). For a number of reforms (101), it 
is not possible to determine the direction. 
 
Table 4: Labour market reforms implemented by all EU countries (2000-2012) and their 
directions 
 Nr. % 
All reforms 2703 100% 
Of which “positive” 1726 64% 
Of which “negative” 876 32% 
 
The share of reforms that cannot be clearly classified as “positive” or “negative” is rather 
heterogeneous across countries as it ranges from a minimum of zero in Poland to a 
maximum of 14.5% in Lithuania (Figure 5). The non-uniform distribution of “unclassified” 
reforms across EU Member States makes it necessary to consider in the following 
analyses the shares of both positive and negative reforms, as the latter is not simply the 
complement to 1 of the former.  
 
Figure 5: Share of labour market reforms that cannot be classified as “positive” or 
“negative” by country (values in %) 
 
Source: our elaboration on LABREF database 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, there is no consensus about the effect of a more 
flexible labour market on firms’ innovation activity. The main aim of the analyses based 
on INNOREG will be to provide further evidence on this issue by using very detailed 
indexes which capture the multiple dimensions of labour market flexibility, as explained 
below. For the moment, we will report only the overall amount of “positive” or “negative” 
(in the sense specified above) labour market reforms. Then, we will try to provide some 
                                           
6 On this we differ from Turrini et al. (2015) who explicitely write that they do not classify 
reforms based on their potential impact of labour market functioning.   
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
 13 
evidence about the intensity and magnitude of the measures implemented by calculating, 
for each country, the number of policy areas and topics affected by reforms which aimed 
to increase labour market flexibility.   
Table A4A and A4B in the Appendix report the number of positive and negative labour 
market reforms by country and year, respectively. On average, each EU Member State 
has implemented 63 positive reforms (Figure 6) during the analysed period, i.e. slightly 
more than 60% of all reforms approved. Apart from Spain, Belgium and Portugal, also 
among the countries which reformed their labour markets most, Germany and Sweden 
implemented the greatest number of reforms to decrease employment protection (they 
enters with a “positive’’ sign in our measurement framework). In Greece, though rules 
regulating the labour market have been modified several times in the last few years 
(Figure 1), the number of positive reforms is slightly below the EU average.  
 
Figure 6: Total number of reforms increasing labour market flexibility (“positive” 
reforms) in European Union Countries (2000-2012) 
Source: our elaboration on LABREF database 
The direction of the reforming processes implemented by each EU Member State can be 
appreciated by comparing Figures 6 and 7 where countries are ranked according to the 
number of positive and negative reforms adopted, respectively. This comparison confirms 
that Greece, and to some extent Italy, have been implementing a non-negligible share of 
reforms to tighten labour market rules, whereas Spain is the EU country which approved 
the greatest number of both positive and negative reforms.   
 
Figure 7: Total number of reforms decreasing labour market flexibility (“negative” 
reforms) in European Union Countries (2000-2012) 
Source: our elaboration on LABREF database 
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As shown above, the number of positive reforms is only a partial indicator of the changes 
occurring in EU Member States. To provide some evidence about the intensity of the 
reformatory process, tables A5A and A5B, in the Appendix report the number of policy 
domains (out of 9) affected by at least a positive or a negative reform, respectively, by 
year of implementation and country. Similarly, Table A6A and A6B detail the number of 
policy fields (out of 48) affected by the two types of reforms.   
 
Figure 8: Yearly average number of policy domains (out of 9) affected by “positive” and 
“negative” reforms  
Source: our elaboration on LABREF database 
 
Sweden, Belgium and France, after Spain, were the countries that implemented positive 
labour market reforms in the early 2000s most intensively (Figure 8 and 9). Continental 
Northern countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands, which were below the EU 
average for the total number of measures approved, score higher if we look at the 
average number of policy domains and policy fields positively affected by a reform. On 
the other hand, it is confirmed that, in spite of the intense reform undertaken by Greece 
and Italy during the last few years, the number of policy fields and policy domains 
positively affected by these reforms is quite low in these countries. Finally, all Southern 
European countries (Greece, Italy, Malta and Spain) have experienced a rather 
inconsistent reform process, as the number of policy domains affected by measures 
intended to enhance labour market flexibility is close to the number of domains affected 
by reforms with the opposite aim.  
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Figure 9: Yearly average number of policy fields (out of 48) affected by “positive” and 
“negative” reforms  
 
Source: our elaboration on LABREF database 
To synthesize the huge amount of information on labour market reforms, we calculate for 
each country and year a number of indexes which can be found, together with all the 
variables described in this report, in the dataset INNOREG. They provide synthetic 
information on both the direction (towards more flexible labour markets or not) and the 
magnitude (policy domains and policy fields covered) of the reforming process 
undertaken in the EU Member States’ labour markets and can be used (together with 
other covariates) to explain the heterogeneity in the economic performance of countries 
and firms.  We define:  
 
𝑺𝑹𝑷 =
𝑵𝑹𝑷𝒙𝟏𝟎𝟎
𝑵𝑹
 : Share of positive reforms (all policy domains) 
 
𝑺𝑹𝑵 =
𝑵𝑹𝑵𝒙𝟏𝟎𝟎
𝑵𝑹
 : Share of negative reforms (all policy domains) 
 
𝑺𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒐𝒎𝑹 =
𝑵𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒐𝒎𝑹𝒙𝟏𝟎𝟎
𝑵𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒐𝒎
  : Share of policy domains reformed 
 
𝑺𝑷𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒐𝒎𝑹 =
𝑵𝑷𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒐𝒎𝑹𝒙𝟏𝟎𝟎
𝑵𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒐𝒎𝑹
 : Share of policy domains positively reformed 
 
𝑺𝑵𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒐𝒎𝑹 =
𝑵𝑵𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒐𝒎𝑹𝒙𝟏𝟎𝟎
𝑵𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒐𝒎𝑹
 : Share of policy domains negatively reformed  
 
𝑺𝑹𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅𝑹 =
𝑵𝒑𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅𝑹𝒙𝟏𝟎𝟎
𝑵𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅
  : Share of policy fields reformed 
 
𝑺𝑷𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅𝑹 =
𝑵𝑷𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅𝑹𝒙𝟏𝟎𝟎
𝑵𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅𝑹
 : Share of policy fields positively reformed 
 
𝑺𝑵𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅𝑹 =
𝑵𝑵𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅𝑹𝒙𝟏𝟎𝟎
𝑵𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅𝑹
 : Share of policy fields negatively reformed  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Nr. of policy fields positively reformed Nr. of policy fields negatively reformed
 16 
Where: 
𝑵𝑹 = 𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐫𝐞𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐬   
𝑵𝑹𝑷 = 𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐫𝐞𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐬  
𝑵𝑹𝑵 = 𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐧𝐞𝐠𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐫𝐞𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐬  
𝑵𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒐𝒎𝑹 = 𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐩𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐲 𝐝𝐨𝐦𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐬 𝐫𝐞𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐞𝐝  
𝑵𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒐𝒎 = 𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐩𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐲 𝐝𝐨𝐦𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐬  
𝑵𝑷𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒐𝒎𝑹 = 𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐩𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐲 𝐝𝐨𝐦𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐬 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞𝐥𝐲 𝐫𝐞𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐞𝐝  
𝑵𝑵𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒐𝒎𝑹 = 𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐩𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐲 𝐝𝐨𝐦𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐬 𝐧𝐞𝐠𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞𝐥𝐲 𝐫𝐞𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐞𝐝  
𝑵𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅𝑹 = 𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐩𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐲 𝐟𝐢𝐞𝐥𝐝𝐬 𝐫𝐞𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐞𝐝  
𝑵𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅 = 𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐩𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐲 𝐟𝐢𝐞𝐥𝐝𝐬  
𝑵𝑷𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅𝑹 = 𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐩𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐲 𝐟𝐢𝐞𝐥𝐝𝐬 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞𝐥𝐲 𝐫𝐞𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐞𝐝  
𝑵𝑵𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅𝑹 = 𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐩𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐲 𝐟𝐢𝐞𝐥𝐝𝐬 𝐧𝐞𝐠𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞𝐥𝐲 𝐫𝐞𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐞𝐝  
 
Tables A7-A12 in the Appendix report all the above calculated indexes for each country 
and year. 
Table 5 shows the average indexes over the whole period of analysis (2000-2012). In 
particular, the indexes SRP, SRN, SPpoldomR, SNpoldomR, SPpolfieldR, and SNpolfieldR 
offer a picture of the direction of the reforming process. The sum of the shares of positive 
and negative reforms (SRP and SRN) is always below 100 because of the “unclassified” 
reforms. On the other hand, the sum of the shares of policy domains (fields) positively 
and negatively reformed can be greater than 100, as some policy domains (fields) 
involved were affected by both “positive” and “negative” reforms during the analyzed 
period.  
Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany and Sweden, with values of all the “positive” 
indexes (SRP, SPpoldomR, SPpolfieldR) above 70, are the countries which implemented 
the highest share of “positive” labour market reforms. The countries which undertook the 
greatest shares of reforms to tighten labour market regulation (more than 40%) are 
mainly in Southern Europe (Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Malta): Italy and Malta are the 
only countries in the European Union where the share of policy domains (and fields) 
“negatively” reformed is higher than the corresponding positive shares. SpoldomR and 
SpolfieldR, by construction, provide indications of the magnitude of the reforming 
process. The higher these indexes are, the higher the number of policy domains and 
policy fields, as described in Table 2, which are affected by at least one reform of 
whichever type. Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Romania, Spain and Sweden have reformed 
more than 50% of the 9 policy domains and more than 15% of the 48 policy fields. 
According to our indexes, these countries have undertaken the most extensive labour 
market reforms in the EU. Ranked lowest for both indexes are Cyprus, Estonia, Malta and 
Slovenia, where only around 30% of the policy domains and less than 10% of the policy 
fields were affected by a reform.  
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Table 5: Synthetic indexes on labour market reforms in EU countries – Average 2000-
2012 
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Austria 65.9 33.6 52.1 68.2 44.5 14.4 63.7 36.4 
Belgium 69.1 29.8 61.5 65.6 46.9 17.9 66.2 35.1 
Bulgaria 60 37.3 53.3 67.9 51.8 17.3 59.7 39.6 
Cyprus 53.2 45.2 26.9 50.7 49.3 7.1 51.4 46.5 
Czech Republic 62.7 36.7 36.8 72.4 52.8 12.2 60.9 39.6 
Denmark 73.6 25.3 37.4 84.1 42.4 9.3 73.6 29.8 
Estonia 72.5 22.4 30.6 76.9 29.1 8.9 72.9 23.4 
Finland 56.6 42.6 48.7 54 48 14.7 57.4 42.5 
France 70.4 28.8 54.7 71.5 40 15.7 71 29.5 
Germany 70.5 28.9 43.6 71 37.7 13.3 71.4 30.6 
Greece 50.7 42 46.2 54.1 47.6 13.1 54 45.3 
Hungary 64.6 34.2 43.6 74.6 47.8 14.1 70.1 41.5 
Ireland 64.2 31.8 42.7 61.7 43.3 11.7 62.8 34.4 
Italy 49.2 47.6 49.6 65.3 62.9 16 53.5 56.9 
Latvia 56.5 33.2 38 70 44.2 12.7 62.3 38.3 
Lithuania 52.7 32.8 47 62.1 36.7 14.1 53 35.4 
Luxembourg 68.7 30.6 35.4 73.5 44.7 9.3 68.5 36.1 
Malta 40.9 55.5 32.3 36.5 64.5 9.3 39.9 57 
Netherlands 68.3 30.2 38.5 70.7 37.9 10.7 68.1 33.5 
Poland 62.9 37.1 40.7 67.4 55.2 12.5 62 41.1 
Portugal 60.6 30.7 46.3 67.6 42.3 15.8 61 32.6 
Romania 56.1 41.6 54.3 59.2 52.4 15.5 59.8 46.8 
Slovakia 57.9 32.9 38.5 64.5 42.9 11.4 59.4 35.3 
Slovenia 62.5 33.3 27.8 63.9 40.3 7.6 63.5 36.5 
Spain 59.3 35.8 66.7 60.3 53.9 21 61.5 38.3 
Sweden 78.1 19.4 54.6 74.1 29.3 15.5 76.7 21.3 
United  
Kingdom 
58 38.2 38.9 62.9 53.9 13.9 56.7 41.2 
Source: our elaboration on LABREF database 
If we read all the proposed indexes together, it emerges that France and Sweden are the 
countries in the EU which changed their labour market regulation most intensively 
(towards greater flexibility) and extensively during the first decade of 2000. Italy is, of 
the largest EU Member States, the country in which the direction of the reform process is 
less clear: according to the proposed indexes, the Italian labour market in the last few 
years has been characterized by a number of reforms directed at smoothing labour 
market rules equal to the number of reforms aimed at tightening labour market rules.  
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Figure 10: Extension and direction of labour market reforming processes  
 
Source: our elaboration on LABREF database 
Patterns also emerge when we look at Figure 10 where EU countries are plotted along 
two dimensions: the share of policy domains reformed (SpoldomR) and the share of 
positively reformed policy domains (SPpoldomR). The thick gray lines correspond to EU 
average values. The top right quadrant shows countries which have undertaken labour 
market reforms with an intensity and on a magnitude greater than the EU average. The 
bottom right quadrant contains countries that have modified labour regulation more 
broadly than the European average, but have introduced fewer elements of flexibility. In 
the bottom left quadrant lie countries where the reform process has been weaker than 
average, in terms of both extent and flexibility. Finally, the top left quadrant shows 
countries which reformed their labour markets less than average but have achieved 
greater flexibility. 
These indicators offer a picture of the intensity and extent of the reforms undertaken by 
the governments in EU countries. However, LABREF data allows us to go a step further 
and to answer the following questions: 
- which of the 9 policy domains described in Table 2 are most often reformed by 
governments in the European Union?  
- which are most often positively reformed? 
- which are most often negatively reformed? 
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Figure 11 shows the number of “positive” “and negative” reforms implemented in the EU 
over the whole period 2000-2012, by policy domain.   
 
Figure 11: Number of “positive” and “negative” reforms in all EU countries by policy 
domain 2000-2012 
Source: our elaboration on LABREF database 
Most reforms covered two features of the EU labour markets: active labour market 
policies (ALMP) and labour taxation. Quite interestingly, almost all reforms affecting 
active labour market policies have been classified as “positive”, in the sense that they are 
expected to enhance labour market flexibility by increasing returns to employment (with 
respect to unemployment). For the other policy domains, the rate of positive reforms is 
lower, less than 50% for the job protection, unemployment and welfare-related benefits, 
and working-time domains. 
Looking at the distribution of the reforms by country (Table 6), we note that almost all 
policy domains were affected by at least one reform in all countries during the analyzed 
period.  The greatest share of reforms concerned the ALMP domain in all countries but 
Hungary, Italy, Romania, and Slovakia: these countries have also channelled their 
reforms to labour taxation and job protection. Denmark has repeatedly reformed its 
immigration and mobility policy, Romania and Slovakia their job protection systems, 
Hungary its labour taxation, and Greece its wage setting regulations. 
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Table 6: Share of reforms by policy domain  
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Austria 36% 6% 9% 7% 11% 9% 8% 3% 10% 100% 
Belgium 29% 3% 2% 5% 24% 14% 7% 2% 13% 100% 
Bulgaria 26% 2% 9% 12% 19% 7% 11% 2% 12% 100% 
Cyprus 31% 0% 10% 4% 18% 14% 2% 6% 16% 100% 
Czech 
Republic 17% 4% 7% 17% 14% 17% 11% 7% 7% 100% 
Denmark 38% 5% 16% 0% 8% 8% 11% 0% 14% 100% 
Estonia 43% 0% 4% 10% 18% 4% 12% 3% 4% 100% 
Finland 31% 6% 11% 6% 14% 9% 13% 5% 6% 100% 
France 29% 3% 3% 8% 17% 13% 8% 8% 13% 100% 
Germany 38% 3% 6% 4% 11% 13% 6% 3% 15% 100% 
Greece 19% 1% 4% 15% 16% 6% 6% 15% 17% 100% 
Hungary 21% 4% 3% 10% 37% 11% 5% 3% 6% 100% 
Ireland 34% 1% 5% 5% 23% 13% 6% 5% 7% 100% 
Italy 21% 1% 7% 15% 24% 9% 10% 4% 10% 100% 
Latvia 29% 3% 1% 16% 22% 8% 7% 3% 9% 100% 
Lithuania 24% 2% 4% 10% 19% 11% 10% 8% 11% 100% 
Luxembourg 37% 2% 2% 3% 22% 15% 3% 5% 12% 100% 
Malta 42% 0% 2% 8% 16% 8% 3% 2% 20% 100% 
Netherlands 27% 8% 8% 4% 14% 16% 11% 1% 11% 100% 
Poland 38% 7% 5% 9% 12% 6% 5% 5% 12% 100% 
Portugal 34% 5% 8% 8% 14% 8% 11% 6% 5% 100% 
Romania 16% 1% 2% 18% 20% 10% 11% 10% 12% 100% 
Slovakia 13% 11% 6% 18% 18% 10% 7% 6% 12% 100% 
Slovenia 29% 2% 8% 10% 17% 13% 6% 4% 10% 100% 
Spain 26% 9% 7% 10% 22% 9% 5% 6% 5% 100% 
Sweden 35% 2% 13% 4% 18% 7% 11% 3% 7% 100% 
United 
Kingdom 38% 1% 5% 10% 20% 14% 2% 3% 8% 100% 
EU average 30% 3% 6% 9% 18% 10% 8% 5% 11% 100% 
Source: our elaboration on LABREF database 
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Table 7: Share of “positive” reforms by policy domain  
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Austria 97% 43% 60% 25% 83% 10% 33% 33% 55% 
Belgium 96% 100% 100% 38% 97% 0% 64% 67% 38% 
Bulgaria 100% 100% 25% 36% 76% 33% 30% 0% 45% 
Cyprus 94% 
 
60% 0% 33% 14% 100% 67% 0% 
Czech 
Republic 87% 50% 83% 40% 69% 73% 80% 50% 50% 
Denmark 96% 67% 80% 
 
80% 40% 57% 
 
44% 
Estonia 97% 
 
100% 57% 67% 33% 25% 50% 0% 
Finland 100% 100% 92% 0% 100% 0% 7% 40% 0% 
France 97% 33% 100% 70% 90% 13% 56% 56% 67% 
Germany 93% 75% 100% 80% 77% 7% 100% 0% 76% 
Greece 96% 0% 40% 44% 32% 0% 14% 89% 35% 
Hungary 92% 100% 100% 18% 67% 42% 100% 33% 71% 
Ireland 97% 0% 100% 20% 50% 33% 100% 60% 14% 
Italy 93% 0% 50% 35% 67% 0% 15% 67% 38% 
Latvia 89% 0% 100% 33% 62% 25% 43% 33% 33% 
Lithuania 96% 0% 100% 18% 48% 17% 55% 33% 42% 
Luxembourg 91% 100% 100% 0% 92% 11% 50% 33% 57% 
Malta 85% 
 
0% 0% 90% 0% 0% 100% 23% 
Netherlands 95% 86% 57% 100% 75% 46% 67% 100% 33% 
Poland 94% 57% 100% 38% 55% 50% 60% 60% 36% 
Portugal 98% 43% 60% 90% 47% 18% 60% 38% 29% 
Romania 100% 100% 0% 47% 65% 25% 78% 75% 30% 
Slovakia 100% 33% 60% 67% 87% 13% 50% 40% 50% 
Slovenia 100% 100% 25% 60% 100% 0% 0% 50% 20% 
Spain 98% 24% 92% 53% 73% 0% 11% 64% 40% 
Sweden 95% 100% 100% 50% 100% 25% 50% 33% 25% 
United 
Kingdom 98% 100% 33% 55% 45% 20% 100% 33% 11% 
EU average 95% 55% 73% 43% 71% 19% 49% 54% 39% 
Source: our elaboration on LABREF database 
 
As previously noted, the ALMP domain has the greatest share of reforms classified as 
“positive” in all countries (Table 7). In addition, immigration and mobility regulation and 
labour taxation have been reformed largely to reduce barriers to workers’ mobility (both 
across countries and within countries) and to lower the tax burden on work in almost all 
countries. As regards immigration policy, the only countries in which more than 50% of 
the approved reforms aimed to tighten regulatory restrictions on migration and mobility 
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are Bulgaria, Greece, Slovenia and the United Kingdom (Table 8). In Italy, 50% of the 
labour reforms approved aimed to facilitate the entry of foreign workers, and the other 
50% aimed to do the opposite. With regards to labour taxation, the only countries which 
approved reforms which could have increased the tax burden on labour during the first 
decades of 2000s were Cyprus and Greece, while Ireland, Lithuania and Portugal had a 
rather “fluctuating” labour taxation policy.  
 
Table 8: Share of “negative” reforms by policy domain  
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Austria 2.1% 50% 19.4% 73.3% 8.3% 92.9% 66.7% 66.7% 50% 
Belgium 1.9% 0 0 64.3% 2.6% 100% 41.7% 33.3% 66.7% 
Bulgaria 0 0 55% 54.2% 23.8% 62.5% 75% 100% 61.9% 
Cyprus 0 
 
40% 100% 50% 80% 0 50% 100% 
Czech 
Republic 10.7% 50% 25% 78.3% 40% 40.5% 16.7% 50% 38.9% 
Denmark 2.8% 33.3% 12.5% 
 
0 60% 50% 
 
60% 
Estonia 0 
 
0 25% 21.4% 75% 70% 0 100% 
Finland 0 0 4.8% 80% 0 100% 97.2% 60% 100% 
France 2% 66.7% 0 46.7% 9.1% 92.6% 42.9% 47.6% 29.6% 
Germany 4.2% 25% 0 25% 2.8% 85.7% 0 100% 29.6% 
Greece 0 100% 25% 57.4% 40.9% 100% 73.3% 22.2% 55% 
Hungary 2% 0 0 87.5% 27.6% 72.2% 0 66.7% 33.3% 
Ireland 6.3% 100% 0 80% 19.4% 73.3% 0 37.5% 91.7% 
Italy 0 100% 36.1% 74.8% 26.8% 95.8% 85.7% 50% 50% 
Latvia 0 66.7% 0 58.3% 14.4% 60% 25% 25% 58.3% 
Lithuania 0 100% 0 86.7% 17.9% 92% 31.7% 25% 45.8% 
Luxembourg 8.3% 0 0 100% 0 94.4% 50% 66.7% 37.5% 
Malta 3.3% 
 
100% 100% 0 100% 100% 0 72.2% 
Netherlands 4.2% 25% 37.5% 0 8 60% 20% 0 66.7% 
Poland 10% 50% 0 44.4% 54.2% 44.4% 37.5% 66.7% 58.3% 
Portugal 4.2% 50% 30.6% 4.2% 28.6% 71.4% 43.3% 44.4% 83.3% 
Romania 0 0 100% 72.4% 39.3% 70% 33.3% 20% 78.6% 
Slovakia 0 43.3% 37.5% 33.3% 18.8% 75% 58.3% 62.5% 48% 
Slovenia 0 0 83.3% 62.5% 0 83.3% 100% 50% 75% 
Spain 0 75% 7.1% 51.3% 18.2% 100% 83.3% 33.3% 42.9% 
Sweden 3.1% 0 0 66.7% 0 77.8% 54.2% 33.3% 50% 
United 
Kingdom 0 0 72.2% 47.2% 33.4% 71.4% 0 66.7% 80% 
EU average 2.1% 50% 19.4% 73.3% 8.3% 92.9% 66.7% 66.7% 50% 
Source: our elaboration on LABREF database 
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It should be stressed that the proposed exercise offers a purely quantitative description 
of the reforms implemented by each EU Member State.  It does not allow us to assess 
the size and relevance of each reform. However, the reported indicators can draw a 
general picture of the direction and strength of the measures to reform labour market 
regulation in the EU.     
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3.  R&D tax incentives 
Since the 90s, several countries have progressively shifted from direct (grants or 
procurements) to indirect (fiscal incentives) funding of business R&D.  
There are two main types of fiscal incentives: expenditure-based (R&D tax credits, R&D 
tax allowances, payroll withholding tax credit for R&D wages) or income-based 
(preferential tax rates on royalty income and on other income from knowledge capital). 
They can be volume based (i.e. they apply to all qualified R&D expenditures) or 
incremental (i.e. they apply to the additional amount of R&D expenditures) or hybrid 
(volume-increment-based). Finally they can be general or targeted at specific firms 
(SME, start-ups, new claimants, etc.) or at specific R&D expenditures.   
According to the OECD (2010 and 2011), in recent years R&D tax incentive schemes 
have become increasingly simple and generous.  Moreover, longer carry-forward of 
unused R&D credits have been progressively introduced during the financial crisis to help 
firms reporting losses. 
Given the complexity of national business tax systems in general, and of fiscal incentives 
to R&D in particular, comparing these schemes across countries is not an easy task. 
However, a synthetic and comparable index of the generosity of tax incentives in most 
OECD countries was developed in 1990 by Jazek Warda, and revised in 1995, 1999, 
2001, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2012 and 2013 (see for instance Warda, 2009).  
The ‘B-index’ is the before-tax income needed to break even on one dollar of R&D outlays 
and is calculated for representative small and large corporations (Warda 2001). For the 
sake of clarity, we have collected data on the tax subsidy rate (TSR hereafter) which is 1 
minus the B-index. Estimates of this rate are easy to interpret as they amount to the tax 
subsidy (if positive) or the tax burden (if negative) on an additional dollar of R&D.   
Table 9 reports the source of the TSRs and the meaning of the variables for all the 
available years. 
 
Table 9: TSRs data source 
 
Variable Meaning Source 
L1990 Large firms 1990 
STIOutlook2006 Table 35  
L1995 Large firms 1995 
L1999 Large firms 1999 
S1999 SME firms 1999 
L2001 Large firms 2001 
S2001 SME firms 2001 
L2004 Large firms 2004 
S2004 SME firms 2004 
L2006 Large firms 2006 
S2006 SME firms 2006 
L2008 Large firms 2008 STIOutlook2008 Table related to Figure 
2.3  S2008 SME firms 2008 
LP2012 Large Profit-making firms 2012 
File directly provided by OECD 
SP2012 SME profit-making firms 2012 
LP2013 Large Profit-making firms 2013 
SP2013 SME profit-making firms 2013 
LL2013 Large Loss-making firms 2013 
SL2013 SME Loss-making firms 2013 
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Table 10 shows the countries and years for which TSRs are available. Table A12 in the 
Appendix reports the estimated TSRs for all available years and countries.    
 
Table 10: EU countries and years covered by the B-index  
 1990 1995 1999 2001 2004 2006 2008 2012 2013 
Austria X X X X X X X X X 
Belgium X X X X X X X X X 
Bulgaria          
Cyprus          
Czech Republic      X X X X 
Denmark X X X X X X X X X 
Estonia          
Finland X X X X X X X X X 
France X X X X X X X X X 
Germany X X X X X X X X X 
Greece   X X X X X   
Hungary    X X X X X X 
Ireland X X X X X X X X X 
Italy X X X X X X X   
Latvia          
Lithuania          
Luxembourg       X X X 
Malta          
Netherlands X X X X X X X X X 
Poland      X X X X 
Portugal X X X X X X X X X 
Romania          
Slovakia      X X X X 
Slovenia       X X X 
Spain X X X X X X X X X 
Sweden X X X X X X X X X 
United Kingdom X X X X X X X X X 
 
To be consistent with the time interval for which we have developed labour market 
indicators (see Section 2.2), here we comment on TSRs only for three representative 
years (2001, 2006 and 2012) and only for EU countries for which TSRs have been 
calculated continuously during the period 2001-2012.   
Figure 12 ranks countries according to their TSR on large firms in 20017. Countries with 
the least generous R&D tax incentive schemes during the whole period were Germany, 
Finland and Sweden.  Belgium and Ireland, which in 2001 had either no tax subsidies 
(Ireland) or a small tax burden (Belgium), considerably re-oriented their fiscal system 
                                           
7
  From 2012, TSRs are calculated for both large and small firms which are making profit or losses. 
For previous years this information is not available and we report the indexes only for all large 
and small firms.   
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towards more generous R&D tax incentives for large firms. Spain, Portugal, and Denmark 
were relatively more generous in terms of R&D tax incentives during the whole period, 
but it was France that enhanced the generosity of its fiscal system the most.     
 
Figure 12: R&D Tax Subsidy Rate on Large firms in 2001, 2006 and 2012 
Source: our elaboration on OECD (several years), STI Outlook 
A similar picture emerges from Figure 13 which ranks countries according to their TSRs 
on small and medium firms. The Netherlands is among the most generous countries with 
regard to the incentives given to SMEs for innovative activity, after Spain and Portugal. 
Spain is the only country which decreased the generosity of its R&D tax relief for both 
large companies and SMEs in 2012. On the other hand, France was the country which 
enlarged the subsidies for R&D to small firms the most during the analyzed period.   
By comparing the two figures it also emerges that two countries (the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom) have implemented measures over the last few years which favour 
the R&D activity of SMEs more than that of large firms.   
 
Figure 13: R&D Tax Subsidy Rate on SME firms in 2001, 2006 and 2012 
Source: our elaboration on OECD (several years), STI Outlook 
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4.  Business Regulation 
Together with labour market rules and tax policies, business rules and regulations are 
also under the direct control of policy makers. Business regulations can represent a 
barrier to the opening and operation of firms.  However, if they are clear, well designed 
and neutral with respect to firms’ strategic decisions, they can enhance firms’ activity, by 
providing investors with safe and stable regulatory frameworks. Internationally 
comparable indicators of the ease of doing business in EU countries, and also other 
developed and emerging countries, are provided by the DoingBusiness project. The 
project started in 2003, and progressively enlarged the number of topics covered up to 
11 in 2013. These topics, once aggregated, allow us to rank countries according to the 
overall ease of doing business.  DoingBusiness focuses on SMEs operating in the largest 
business city of each country, and provides quantitative indicators on the regulation that 
applies to these firms at different stages of their life cycle. DoingBusiness reported 
annually from 2004 to 2014 for all EU countries. The topics covered by the report and the 
corresponding indicators are shown in Table 11.8 
Table 11: Topics and indicators covered by the DoingBusiness report 
Topic Indicator 
Starting a Business 
  
  
  
 
Rank 
Procedures (number) 
Time (days) 
Cost (% of income per capita) 
Paid-in Min. Capital (% of income per capita) 
Dealing with Construction Permits 
  
  
  
Rank 
Procedures (number) 
Time (days) 
Cost (% of income per capita) 
Getting Electricity 
  
  
  
Rank 
Procedures (number) 
Time (days) 
Cost (% of income per capita) 
Registering Property 
  
  
  
Rank 
Procedures (number) 
Time (days) 
Cost (% of property value) 
Getting Credit 
  
  
  
  
Rank 
Strength of legal rights index (0-10) 
Depth of credit information index (0-6) 
Public registry coverage (% of adults) 
Private bureau coverage (% of adults) 
Protecting Investors 
  
  
  
  
Rank 
Extent of disclosure index (0-10) 
Extent of director liability index (0-10) 
Ease of shareholder suits index (0-10) 
Strength of investor protection index (0-10) 
                                           
8  An Appendix B is available on request, which contains further information on data used in this 
study. Table B3 in this Appendix reports the indicator names (and corresponding labels) as 
defined in the Doing Business Stata file. 
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Topic Indicator 
Paying Taxes 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Rank 
Payments (number per year) 
Time (hours per year) 
Profit tax (%) 
Labour tax and contributions (%) 
Other taxes (%) 
Total tax rate (% profit) 
Trading Across Borders 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Rank 
Documents to export (number) 
Time to export (days) 
Cost to export (US$ per container) 
Documents to import (number) 
Time to import (days) 
Cost to import (US$ per container) 
Enforcing Contracts 
  
  
  
Rank 
Time (days) 
Cost (% of claim) 
Procedures (number) 
Resolving Insolvency 
  
  
  
  
Rank 
Time (years) 
Cost (% of estate) 
Outcome (0 as piecemeal sale and 1 as going concern) 
Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 
 
Given the large number of indicators, each scholar should make a selection according to 
specific research questions. As an example of the potential of the dataset, we show here 
a very partial picture of the complexity of business regulations in EU countries, by 
focusing on two indicators that are calculated for several topics, i.e. the number of 
procedures and the time needed to achieve a certain objective.  Among the objectives for 
which these indicators have been calculated by DoingBusiness, we focus on two which 
can affect the innovative capacity of the economic system as a whole: starting a business 
and enforcing contracts.  
Figures 14 and 15 rank EU countries according to the number of procedures and the time 
(days) needed to start a business in 2004 and compare these rankings with the 
corresponding figures for 2012.   
The number of procedures to be completed to start a business is 2004 goes from a 
minimum of 3 in Finland and Sweden, to a maximum of 15 in Greece (where it decreased 
to 11 in 2012). The average number of procedures in EU countries was 8 in 2004 and it 
dropped to 6 in 2012. In general, procedures for starting a business are lighter in Nordic 
countries, and more complex in Southern European countries, at least according to this 
indicator.  
Rather unexpectedly, the number of procedures is not greatly correlated with the time 
needed to start a business: Finland and Greece, which ranked at the opposite ends of the 
distribution of the number of procedures, are very similar in terms of the number of days 
needed, on average, to start a new business.  
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Figure 14: Number of procedures needed to start a business 
Source: our elaboration on DoingBusiness database 
 
Figure 15: Number of days needed to start a business 
Source: our elaboration on DoingBusiness database 
 
In 2004, the countries with the fastest procedures were Denmark, Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom (less than two weeks), while the slowest procedures were in Slovakia 
and Spain (more than three months needed).  However, looking at the bars 
corresponding to 2012, the tremendous effort made by countries, which in 2004 had very 
long procedures, is evident: for example, Spain dropped the number of days needed to 
start a business from 114 to 28, Portugal from 78 to 3. This effort by all EU countries to 
make the opening of new entrepreneurial activities easier and faster is also evident when 
we look at the EU average value, which has dropped from 40 days to two weeks. It would 
be interesting to investigate whether this speeding up of bureaucratic procedures over 
the last few years has positively affected the innovative capability of EU countries.  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
2004 2012
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2004 2012
 30 
Figure 16: Number of procedures needed to enforce a contract 
Source: our elaboration on DoingBusiness database 
 
Figure 17: Number of days needed to enforce a contract 
Source: our elaboration on DoingBusiness database 
 
A different picture emerges when we look at the procedures needed to enforce contracts. 
In this case (Figures 16 and 17), neither the number of procedures nor the time required 
to complete the procedures significantly dropped during the analysed period. Southern 
European countries (Greece, Italy and Spain, together with Cyprus and Malta in 2012) 
with some Eastern countries (Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic) have the longest and 
most complex bureaucratic processes to enforce contracts, whereas Nordic countries – 
and also France and Germany - have lighter and faster procedures. Ineffective 
commercial dispute resolution can discourage investors and new business relationships, 
and the impact of this on companies’ innovation activities should be taken into account. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1: Number of measures concerning labour market by year of implementation and 
country 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 12 4 14 9 6 8 4 4 18 14 6 9 1 
Belgium 9 7 13 8 14 13 9 11 13 20 18 11 10 
Bulgaria 
   
7 9 7 7 11 6 15 18 8 2 
Cyprus 1 1 1 8 2 
 
6 2 3 14 5 4 4 
Czech 
Republic 8 6 2 2 18 8 3 6 12 10 1 7 7 
Denmark 
 
2 5 8 8 3 3 
 
12 9 6 2 5 
Estonia 3 1 1 
 
5 3 1 3 9 25 6 6 4 
Finland 9 9 12 6 18 6 6 3 9 10 15 3 1 
France 3 5 5 3 13 20 13 10 13 18 7 9 1 
Germany 4 10 9 13 9 9 6 6 10 25 6 2 8 
Greece 1 9 5 5 10 3 3 4 24 8 25 18 3 
Hungary 4 2 2 5 7 10 10 9 7 20 15 20 2 
Ireland 8 5 3 1 6 8 9 8 5 18 11 4 9 
Italy 5 11 11 15 6 8 3 22 20 7 14 12 2 
Latvia 
 
1 9 8 7 4 11 12 16 8 7 10 2 
Lithuania 3 3 2 11 9 7 6 10 6 15 13 12 11 
Luxembourg 2 3 5 1 4 8 3 6 
 
13 11 4 
 Malta 
  
5 3 10 11 1 5 13 9 4 2 1 
Netherlands 3 7 6 2 11 7 13 17 1 9 5 1 1 
Poland 3 1 13 9 20 5 2 16 
 
12 5 5 3 
Portugal 3 4 3 8 10 4 5 16 7 49 16 7 
 Romania 
   
7 5 13 9 4 6 10 8 21 
 Slovakia 2 1 6 6 10 4 3 11 1 14 4 19 3 
Slovenia 1 2 2 3 4 4 1 9 
 
10 4 6 2 
Spain 11 13 17 17 11 13 24 18 6 8 13 27 4 
Sweden 7 5 6 6 5 8 20 15 8 14 11 4 
 United 
Kingdom 3 3 2 17 13 2 1 11 7 26 7 19 
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Table A2: Number of policy domains (out of 9) affected by reforms by year of 
implementation and country 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 7 3 7 5 5 4 4 4 7 5 4 5 1 
Belgium 6 6 6 5 5 5 4 6 6 7 4 7 5 
Bulgaria 
   
4 4 4 6 6 4 7 7 4 2 
Cyprus 1 1 1 4 1 
 
4 2 3 4 2 3 3 
Czech  
Republic 5 3 1 2 6 5 2 4 4 4 1 4 2 
Denmark 
 
1 3 4 4 2 2 
 
6 6 4 1 4 
Estonia 2 1 1 
 
3 2 1 3 5 7 4 2 2 
Finland 6 7 7 5 5 4 5 2 4 4 5 2 1 
France 3 5 4 3 7 5 7 6 7 6 4 6 1 
Germany 4 7 1 5 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 1 3 
Greece 1 8 4 2 5 3 3 4 7 5 6 4 2 
Hungary 3 2 2 4 4 5 3 6 5 5 4 7 1 
Ireland 6 3 2 1 5 5 4 5 3 5 4 3 4 
Italy 3 5 5 5 4 6 2 5 7 4 5 6 1 
Latvia 
 
1 5 5 4 2 5 4 5 3 3 3 1 
Lithuania 2 2 1 6 6 6 4 5 2 6 5 6 4 
Luxembourg 1 3 4 1 3 3 2 4 
 
6 6 2 
 Malta 
  
2 1 5 3 1 3 6 4 4 2 1 
Netherlands 2 4 4 2 7 4 6 6 1 4 3 1 1 
Poland 2 1 7 4 8 3 2 5 
 
4 3 3 2 
Portugal 2 4 2 5 6 2 4 7 2 8 5 3 
 Romania 
   
4 3 6 7 4 2 6 4 8 
 Slovakia 2 1 4 3 6 4 2 6 1 4 3 7 2 
Slovenia 1 2 2 2 2 3 1 4 
 
4 4 4 1 
Spain 5 7 7 7 6 7 8 7 4 4 5 7 4 
Sweden 6 3 4 3 4 6 6 7 6 5 6 3 
 United  
Kingdom 2 3 1 4 5 2 1 5 4 6 4 5 
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Table A3 Number of policy fields (out of 48) affected by reforms by year of 
implementation and country 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 12 3 11 7 6 6 4 4 13 9 6 8 1 
Belgium 8 7 11 8 8 9 6 8 10 13 9 7 8 
Bulgaria 
   
7 9 7 7 10 6 14 14 7 2 
Cyprus 1 1 1 6 2 
 
6 2 3 8 4 4 3 
Czech  
Republic 7 6 2 2 14 6 3 6 7 8 1 7 7 
Denmark 
 
2 5 5 8 2 3 
 
9 6 4 1 4 
Estonia 2 1 1 
 
5 3 1 3 6 18 5 3 3 
Finland 8 9 11 6 11 6 6 3 9 8 11 3 1 
France 3 5 5 3 11 13 11 9 9 13 7 8 1 
Germany 4 9 4 11 7 6 4 5 9 11 5 2 6 
Greece 1 9 5 3 7 3 3 4 12 8 15 9 3 
Hungary 3 2 2 5 6 9 9 9 6 10 8 18 1 
Ireland 8 5 2 1 6 6 8 6 4 9 8 3 7 
Italy 5 7 9 11 5 7 3 12 15 4 10 11 1 
Latvia 
 
1 8 8 7 4 11 5 9 6 6 6 2 
Lithuania 3 2 1 10 8 7 5 9 3 12 10 11 7 
Luxembourg 2 3 5 1 4 7 2 6 
 
8 9 2 
 Malta 
  
4 2 9 5 1 4 10 7 4 2 1 
Netherlands 3 6 4 2 9 5 10 12 1 8 5 1 1 
Poland 3 1 9 8 16 3 2 10 
 
8 4 5 3 
Portugal 3 4 3 6 9 4 5 13 4 25 9 6 
 Romania 
   
7 4 11 8 4 3 9 5 16 
 Slovakia 2 1 5 6 8 4 3 11 1 9 4 15 2 
Slovenia 1 2 2 3 4 4 1 8 
 
8 4 6 1 
Spain 7 12 13 10 8 11 15 12 6 7 11 15 4 
Sweden 7 4 6 5 5 8 12 12 8 10 8 4 
 United  
Kingdom 3 3 2 10 10 2 1 8 6 16 7 12 
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Table A4A: Amount of reforms enhancing labour market flexibility (i.e. “positive” 
reforms) by year of implementation and country 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 8 3 6 9 2 6 2 2 12 9 4 6 1 
Belgium 5 5 7 5 11 9 5 9 7 
 
15 8 1 
Bulgaria 
   
4 4 5 4 7 6 7 13 3 1 
Cyprus 1 
 
1 1 2 
 
4 
 
2 8 3 
 
3 
Czech  
Republic 3 3 1 2 10 6 2 3 10 9 
 
5 6 
Denmark 
 
1 4 6 6 1 3 
 
9 7 5 2 3 
Estonia 2 
 
1 
 
5 2 1 2 5 16 5 4 4 
Finland 7 4 6 3 17 4 4 3 5 9 6 
  France 1 2 4 3 9 16 11 7 11 11 4 5 1 
Germany 3 7 9 12 9 8 5 4 8 15 3 
 
4 
Greece 1 2 2 2 4 3 1 1 12 3 19 11 1 
Hungary 3 1 1 3 7 9 3 4 5 14 11 15 1 
Ireland 3 3 3 
 
5 5 4 5 4 12 9 4 5 
Italy 3 8 7 8 1 2 1 12 7 2 10 9 1 
Latvia 
  
3 3 4 3 7 4 7 5 5 10 2 
Lithuania 
 
2 2 3 4 5 3 6 2 1 9 5 6 
Luxembourg 1 1 4 1 3 6 3 3 
 
9 8 2 
 Malta 
    
7 1 
 
4 7 5 2 1 
 Netherlands 3 4 6 2 8 6 5 13 
 
7 4 
 
1 
Poland 3 
 
12 7 11 3 2 13 
 
9 1 3 1 
Portugal 1 2 2 2 5 1 3 11 7 33 13 7 
 Romania 
   
2 4 1 2 1 5 5 5 16 
 Slovakia 2 
 
2 5 7 2 1 3 1 11 3 13 1 
Slovenia 1 1 1 2 4 3 1 5 
 
7 2 2 
 Spain 8 5 9 9 10 6 15 11 4 6 10 2 
 Sweden 6 4 4 6 4 4 16 12 8 12 6 3 
 United  
Kingdom 3 2 1 7 6 1 
 
5 6 17 5 14 
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Table A4B: Amount of reforms reducing labour market flexibility (i.e. “negative” 
reforms) by year of implementation and country 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 4 1 8 0 4 2 2 2 5 5 2 3 0 
Belgium 4 2 6 3 3 4 4 2 6 8 2 2 0 
Bulgaria 
   
2 5 2 3 4 0 8 5 4 1 
Cyprus 0 1 0 7 0 
 
2 2 1 6 1 4 1 
Czech  
Republic 5 3 1 0 8 2 1 3 1 1 1 2 1 
Denmark 
 
1 1 2 1 2 0 
 
3 2 1 0 2 
Estonia 1 1 0 
 
0 0 0 1 3 9 1 1 0 
Finland 2 4 6 3 1 2 2 0 4 1 9 3 1 
France 2 3 1 0 4 4 2 2 2 7 3 4 0 
Germany 1 3 0 1 0 1 1 2 2 8 3 2 4 
Greece 0 5 3 1 6 0 2 2 10 5 6 7 2 
Hungary 1 1 1 2 0 1 7 5 2 5 3 4 1 
Ireland 4 2 0 1 1 3 4 3 0 6 1 0 4 
Italy 2 3 4 5 5 6 2 6 11 5 4 3 1 
Latvia 
 
1 5 2 3 1 4 2 5 3 2 0 0 
Lithuania 2 0 0 7 4 1 3 1 2 4 4 6 4 
Luxembourg 1 2 1 0 1 2 0 3 
 
3 3 2 
 Malta 
  
5 3 3 0 1 1 5 2 2 1 1 
Netherlands 0 3 0 0 3 1 7 2 1 2 1 1 0 
Poland 0 1 1 2 9 2 0 3 
 
3 4 2 2 
Portugal 1 2 1 6 3 2 1 5 0 16 2 0 
 Romania 
   
5 1 3 6 3 1 5 3 3 
 Slovakia 0 0 4 1 1 2 2 8 0 3 1 6 2 
Slovenia 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 4 
 
3 2 4 1 
Spain 3 8 6 8 1 7 9 4 2 2 3 4 3 
Sweden 1 1 2 0 0 4 4 3 0 2 4 1 
 United  
Kingdom 0 0 1 10 7 1 1 5 1 8 2 5 
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Table A5A: Amount of policy domains (out of 9) affected by at least one reform 
enhancing labour market flexibility (i.e. “positive” reforms) by year of implementation 
and country 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 6 2 4 5 2 2 2 2 5 3 3 4 1 
Belgium 3 4 4 3 3 3 2 5 4 2 3 6 5 
Bulgaria 
   
3 3 3 3 3 4 4 5 3 1 
Cyprus 1 
 
1 1 1 
 
3 
 
2 1 1 
 
2 
Czech  
Republic 2 3 1 2 4 3 1 3 4 3 
 
3 2 
Denmark 
 
1 3 4 4 1 2 
 
4 5 3 1 2 
Estonia 1 
 
1 
 
3 2 1 2 3 5 3 2 2 
Finland 4 4 3 3 5 2 3 2 2 3 2 
  France 1 2 4 3 6 4 6 4 5 5 2 2 1 
Germany 3 5 1 5 4 4 3 2 3 4 2 
 
2 
Greece 1 2 1 1 2 3 1 1 4 2 5 3 1 
Hungary 2 1 1 2 4 4 2 4 3 4 4 7 1 
Ireland 2 2 2 
 
4 2 1 2 2 5 3 3 3 
Italy 2 3 4 4 1 2 1 5 4 2 4 4 1 
Latvia 
  
3 3 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 1 
Lithuania 
 
1 1 2 3 5 2 4 2 5 3 4 2 
Luxembourg 1 1 3 1 2 3 2 2 
 
3 5 1 
 Malta 
    
3 2 
 
2 2 3 2 1 
 Netherlands 2 2 4 2 6 3 3 5 
 
3 3 
 
1 
Poland 2 
 
6 3 5 2 2 3 
 
3 1 3 1 
Portugal 1 2 2 2 3 1 2 6 2 6 3 3 
 Romania 
   
1 2 4 2 1 2 2 4 7 
 Slovakia 2 
 
2 2 5 2 1 3 1 4 2 5 1 
Slovenia 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 3 
 
3 2 2 
 Spain 3 4 4 4 5 3 6 5 2 2 4 7 
 Sweden 5 3 2 3 3 3 5 5 6 3 3 2 
 United  
Kingdom 2 2 1 2 3 1 
 
1 3 5 2 5 
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Table A5B: Amount of policy domains (out of 9) affected by at least one reform reducing 
labour market flexibility (i.e. “negative” reforms) by year of implementation and country 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 3 1 6 0 4 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 0 
Belgium 3 2 3 3 2 3 4 2 2 5 2 2 0 
Bulgaria 
   
2 3 2 3 3 0 5 5 2 1 
Cyprus 0 1 0 3 0 
 
1 2 1 3 1 3 1 
Czech  
Republic 4 1 1 0 5 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 
Denmark 
 
1 1 2 1 2 0 
 
3 2 1 0 2 
Estonia 1 1 0 
 
0 0 0 1 1 5 1 1 0 
Finland 2 2 4 2 1 2 2 0 2 1 4 2 1 
France 2 3 1 0 4 3 1 2 2 2 3 4 0 
Germany 1 3 0 1 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 
Greece 0 4 3 1 3 0 2 2 4 3 3 2 1 
Hungary 1 1 1 2 0 1 3 3 2 3 1 3 1 
Ireland 4 2 0 1 1 3 2 3 0 2 1 0 3 
Italy 2 2 3 2 3 5 1 3 4 3 3 3 1 
Latvia 
 
1 2 1 2 1 3 2 3 1 2 0 0 
Lithuania 1 0 0 3 3 1 2 1 1 3 2 3 2 
Luxembourg 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 2 
 
3 2 2 
 Malta 
  
2 1 3 0 1 1 4 2 2 1 1 
Netherlands 0 2 0 0 3 1 5 2 1 1 1 1 0 
Poland 0 1 1 2 4 2 0 2 
 
3 3 2 2 
Portugal 1 2 1 3 3 1 1 4 0 6 2 0 
 Romania 
   
3 1 3 5 3 1 4 1 2 
 Slovakia 0 0 3 1 1 2 2 4 0 1 1 4 2 
Slovenia 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 3 
 
1 2 2 1 
Spain 2 6 4 3 1 5 3 4 2 2 3 4 3 
Sweden 1 1 2 0 0 3 3 2 0 2 3 1 
 United  
Kingdom 0 0 1 3 3 1 1 4 1 4 2 2 
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Table A6A: Amount of policy fields (out of 48) affected by at least one reform enhancing 
labour market flexibility (i.e. “positive” reforms) by year of implementation and country 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 8 2 5 7 2 4 2 2 7 6 4 5 1 
Belgium 5 5 6 5 5 6 3 6 6 6 7 5 8 
Bulgaria 
   
4 4 5 4 6 6 6 10 3 1 
Cyprus 1 
 
1 1 2 
 
4 
 
2 4 2 
 
2 
Czech  
Republic 3 3 1 2 7 4 2 3 5 7 
 
5 6 
Denmark 
 
1 4 4 6 1 3 
 
6 5 3 1 2 
Estonia 1 
 
1 
 
5 2 1 2 3 11 4 3 3 
Finland 6 4 6 3 11 4 4 3 5 7 5 0 
 France 1 2 4 3 8 10 10 6 7 10 4 4 1 
Germany 3 6 4 10 7 5 3 3 7 8 3 0 4 
Greece 1 2 2 2 3 3 1 1 7 3 13 5 1 
Hungary 2 1 1 3 6 8 3 4 4 8 7 15 1 
Ireland 3 3 2 
 
5 3 4 3 3 7 6 3 4 
Italy 3 4 6 5 1 2 1 8 6 1 8 8 1 
Latvia 
  
3 3 4 3 7 3 6 4 5 6 2 
Lithuania 
 
1 1 3 3 5 3 6 2 7 6 5 3 
Luxembourg 1 1 4 1 3 6 2 3 
 
5 6 1 
 Malta 
    
6 4 
 
3 6 4 2 1 
 Netherlands 3 3 4 2 6 4 5 10 
 
6 4 
 
1 
Poland 3 
 
8 6 8 2 2 7 
 
6 1 3 1 
Portugal 1 2 2 2 5 1 3 9 4 18 6 6 
 Romania 
   
2 3 8 2 1 3 4 4 14 
 Slovakia 2 
 
2 5 5 2 1 3 1 7 3 11 1 
Slovenia 1 1 1 2 4 3 1 5 
 
6 2 2 
 Spain 5 5 8 7 7 4 11 8 4 5 8 12 
 Sweden 6 3 4 5 4 4 9 10 8 8 4 3 
 United  
Kingdom 3 2 1 3 6 1 
 
3 5 9 5 9 
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Table A6B: Amount of policy fields (out of 48) affected by at least one reform reducing 
labour market flexibility (i.e. “negative” reforms) by year of implementation and country 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 4 1 7 0 4 2 2 2 5 3 2 3 0 
Belgium 3 2 5 3 3 3 4 2 4 7 2 2 0 
Bulgaria 
   
2 5 2 3 4 0 8 5 4 1 
Cyprus 0 1 0 5 0 
 
2 2 1 4 1 4 1 
Czech  
Republic 5 3 1 0 8 2 1 3 1 1 1 2 1 
Denmark 
 
1 1 1 1 2 0 
 
3 1 1 0 2 
Estonia 1 1 0 
 
0 0 0 1 2 8 1 0 0 
Finland 2 4 5 3 1 2 2 0 4 1 6 3 1 
France 2 3 1 0 4 3 1 2 2 4 3 4 0 
Germany 1 3 0 1 0 1 1 2 2 4 2 2 3 
Greece 0 5 3 1 4 0 2 2 5 5 6 5 2 
Hungary 1 1 1 2 0 1 6 5 2 4 3 4 1 
Ireland 4 2 0 1 1 3 3 3 0 3 1 0 4 
Italy 2 3 4 4 4 6 2 5 9 3 4 3 1 
Latvia 
 
1 5 2 3 1 4 2 4 3 2 0 0 
Lithuania 2 0 0 6 4 1 2 1 1 4 4 6 4 
Luxembourg 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 3 
 
3 3 2 
 Malta 
  
4 2 3 0 1 1 4 2 2 1 1 
Netherlands 0 3 0 0 3 1 7 2 1 2 1 1 0 
Poland 0 1 1 2 8 1 0 3 
 
3 4 2 2 
Portugal 1 2 1 4 3 2 1 5 0 11 2 0 
 Romania 
   
5 1 3 6 3 1 5 2 3 
 Slovakia 0 0 3 1 1 2 2 8 0 2 1 5 2 
Slovenia 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 3 
 
2 2 4 1 
Spain 2 8 5 3 1 7 5 4 2 2 3 4 3 
Sweden 1 1 2 0 0 4 4 2 0 2 3 1 
 United  
Kingdom 0 0 1 7 4 1 1 5 1 7 2 4 
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Table A7A: SRP index: Share of reforms enhancing labour market flexibility (“positive” reforms) by year of implementation and country 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 66.7 75 42.9 100 33.3 75 50 50 66.7 64.3 66.7 66.7 100 
Belgium 55.6 71.4 53.8 62.5 78.6 69.2 55.6 81.8 53.8 60 83.3 72.7 100 
Bulgaria 
   
57.1 44.4 71.4 57.1 63.6 100 46.7 72.2 37.5 50 
Cyprus 100 0 100 12.5 100 
 
66.7 0 66.7 57.1 60 0 75 
Czech Republic 37.5 50 50 100 55.6 75 66.7 50 83.3 90 0 71.4 85.7 
Denmark 
 
50 80 75 75 33.3 100 
 
75 77.8 83.3 100 60 
Estonia 66.7 0 100 
 
100 66.7 100 66.7 55.6 64 83.3 66.7 100 
Finland 77.8 44.4 50 50 94.4 66.7 66.7 100 55.6 90 40 0 0 
France 33.3 40 80 100 69.2 80 84.6 70 84.6 61.1 57.1 55.6 100 
Germany 75 70 100 92.3 100 88.9 83.3 66.7 80 60 50 0 50 
Greece 100 22.2 40 40 40 100 33.3 25 50 37.5 76 61.1 33.3 
Hungary 75 50 50 60 100 90 30 44.4 71.4 70 73.3 75 50 
Ireland 37.5 60 100 0 83.3 62.5 44.4 62.5 80 66.7 81.8 100 55.6 
Italy 60 72.7 63.6 53.3 16.7 25 33.3 54.5 35 28.6 71.4 75 50 
Latvia 
 
0 33.3 37.5 57.1 75 63.6 33.3 43.8 62.5 71.4 100 100 
Lithuania 0 66.7 100 27.3 44.4 71.4 50 60 33.3 66.7 69.2 41.7 54.5 
Luxembourg 50 33.3 80 100 75 75 100 50 
 
69.2 72.7 50 
 Malta 
  
0 0 70 90.9 0 80 53.8 55.6 50 50 0 
Netherlands 100 57.1 100 100 72.7 85.7 38.5 76.5 0 77.8 80 0 100 
Poland 100 0 92.3 77.8 55 60 100 81.3 
 
75 20 60 33.3 
Portugal 33.3 50 66.7 25 50 25 60 68.8 100 67.3 81.3 100 
 Romania 
   
28.6 80 76.9 22.2 25 83.3 50 62.5 76.2 
 Slovakia 100 0 33.3 83.3 70 50 33.3 27.3 100 78.6 75 68.4 33.3 
Slovenia 100 50 50 66.7 100 75 100 55.6 
 
70 50 33.3 0 
Spain 72.7 38.5 52.9 52.9 90.9 46.2 62.5 61.1 66.7 75 76.9 74.1 0 
Sweden 85.7 80 66.7 100 80 50 80 80 100 85.7 54.5 75 
 United Kingdom 100 66.7 50 41.2 46.2 50 0 45.5 85.7 65.4 71.4 73.7 
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Table A7B: SRN index: Share of reforms reducing labour market flexibility (“negative” reforms) by year of implementation and country 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 33.3 25 57.1 0 66.7 25 50 50 27.8 35.7 33.3 33.3 0 
Belgium 44.4 28.6 46.2 37.5 21.4 30.8 44.4 18.2 46.2 40 11.1 18.2 0 
Bulgaria 
   
28.6 55.6 28.6 42.9 36.4 0 53.3 27.8 50 50 
Cyprus 0 100 0 87.5 0 
 
33.3 100 33.3 42.9 20 100 25 
Czech Republic 62.5 50 50 0 44.4 25 33.3 50 8.3 10 100 28.6 14.3 
Denmark 
 
50 20 25 12.5 66.7 0 
 
25 22.2 16.7 0 40 
Estonia 33.3 100 0 
 
0 0 0 33.3 33.3 36 16.7 16.7 0 
Finland 22.2 44.4 50 50 5.6 33.3 33.3 0 44.4 10 60 100 100 
France 66.7 60 20 0 30.8 20 15.4 20 15.4 38.9 42.9 44.4 0 
Germany 25 30 0 7.7 0 11.1 16.7 33.3 20 32 50 100 50 
Greece 0 55.6 60 20 60 0 66.7 50 41.7 62.5 24 38.9 66.7 
Hungary 25 50 50 40 0 10 70 55.6 28.6 25 20 20 50 
Ireland 50 40 0 100 16.7 37.5 44.4 37.5 0 33.3 9.1 0 44.4 
Italy 40 27.3 36.4 33.3 83.3 75 66.7 27.3 55 71.4 28.6 25 50 
Latvia 
 
100 55.6 25 42.9 25 36.4 16.7 31.3 37.5 28.6 0 0 
Lithuania 66.7 0 0 63.6 44.4 14.3 50 10 33.3 26.7 30.8 50 36.4 
Luxembourg 50 66.7 20 0 25 25 0 50 
 
23.1 27.3 50 
 Malta 
 
1 0 100 30 0 100 20 38.5 22.2 50 50 100 
Netherlands 0 42.9 0 0 27.3 14.3 53.8 11.8 100 22.2 20 100 0 
Poland 0 100 7.7 22.2 45 40 0 18.8 
 
25 80 40 66.7 
Portugal 33.3 50 33.3 75 30 50 20 31.3 0 32.7 12.5 0 
 Romania 
   
71.4 20 23.1 66.7 75 16.7 50 37.5 14.3 
 Slovakia 0 0 66.7 16.7 10 50 66.7 72.7 0 21.4 25 31.6 66.7 
Slovenia 0 50 50 33.3 0 25 0 44.4 
 
30 50 66.7 50 
Spain 27.3 61.5 35.3 47.1 9.1 53.8 37.5 22.2 33.3 25 23.1 14.8 75 
Sweden 14.3 20 33.3 0 0 50 20 20 0 14.3 36.4 25 
 United Kingdom 0 0 50 58.8 53.8 50 100 45.5 14.3 30.8 28.6 26.3 
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Table A8: SpoldomR index: Share of policy domains affected by at least one labour market reform by year of implementation and country 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 77.8 33.3 77.8 55.6 55.6 44.4 44.4 44.4 77.8 55.6 44.4 55.6 11.1 
Belgium 66.7 66.7 66.7 55.6 55.6 55.6 44.4 66.7 66.7 77.8 44.4 77.8 55.6 
Bulgaria 
   
44.4 44.4 44.4 66.7 66.7 44.4 77.8 77.8 44.4 22.2 
Cyprus 11.1 11.1 11.1 44.4 11.1 
 
44.4 22.2 33.3 44.4 22.2 33.3 33.3 
Czech Republic 55.6 33.3 11.1 22.2 66.7 55.6 22.2 44.4 44.4 44.4 11.1 44.4 22.2 
Denmark 
 
11.1 33.3 44.4 44.4 22.2 22.2 
 
66.7 66.7 44.4 11.1 44.4 
Estonia 22.2 11.1 11.1 
 
33.3 22.2 11.1 33.3 55.6 77.8 44.4 22.2 22.2 
Finland 66.7 77.8 77.8 55.6 55.6 44.4 55.6 22.2 44.4 44.4 55.6 22.2 11.1 
France 33.3 55.6 44.4 33.3 77.8 55.6 77.8 66.7 77.8 66.7 44.4 66.7 11.1 
Germany 44.4 77.8 11.1 55.6 44.4 55.6 44.4 44.4 44.4 55.6 44.4 11.1 33.3 
Greece 11.1 88.9 44.4 22.2 55.6 33.3 33.3 44.4 77.8 55.6 66.7 44.4 22.2 
Hungary 33.3 22.2 22.2 44.4 44.4 55.6 33.3 66.7 55.6 55.6 44.4 77.8 11.1 
Ireland 66.7 33.3 22.2 11.1 55.6 55.6 44.4 55.6 33.3 55.6 44.4 33.3 44.4 
Italy 33.3 55.6 55.6 55.6 44.4 66.7 22.2 55.6 77.8 44.4 55.6 66.7 11.1 
Latvia 
 
11.1 55.6 55.6 44.4 22.2 55.6 44.4 55.6 33.3 33.3 33.3 11.1 
Lithuania 22.2 22.2 11.1 66.7 66.7 66.7 44.4 55.6 22.2 66.7 55.6 66.7 44.4 
Luxembourg 11.1 33.3 44.4 11.1 33.3 33.3 22.2 44.4 
 
66.7 66.7 22.2 
 Malta 
  
22.2 11.1 55.6 33.3 11.1 33.3 66.7 44.4 44.4 22.2 11.1 
Netherlands 22.2 44.4 44.4 22.2 77.8 44.4 66.7 66.7 11.1 44.4 33.3 11.1 11.1 
Poland 22.2 11.1 77.8 44.4 88.9 33.3 22.2 55.6 
 
44.4 33.3 33.3 22.2 
Portugal 22.2 44.4 22.2 55.6 66.7 22.2 44.4 77.8 22.2 88.9 55.6 33.3 
 Romania 
   
44.4 33.3 66.7 77.8 44.4 22.2 66.7 44.4 88.9 
 Slovakia 22.2 11.1 44.4 33.3 66.7 44.4 22.2 66.7 11.1 44.4 33.3 77.8 22.2 
Slovenia 11.1 22.2 22.2 22.2 22.2 33.3 11.1 44.4 
 
44.4 44.4 44.4 11.1 
Spain 55.6 77.8 77.8 77.8 66.7 77.8 88.9 77.8 44.4 44.4 55.6 77.8 44.4 
Sweden 66.7 33.3 44.4 33.3 44.4 66.7 66.7 77.8 66.7 55.6 66.7 33.3 
 United Kingdom 22.2 33.3 11.1 44.4 55.6 22.2 11.1 55.6 44.4 66.7 44.4 55.6 
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Table A9A: SPpoldomR index: Share of policy domains affected by at least one labour market reform enhancing flexibility (“positive” 
reform) out of those reformed, by year of implementation and country 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 85.7 66.7 57.1 100 40 50 50 50 71.4 60 75 80 100 
Belgium 50 66.7 66.7 60 60 60 50 83.3 66.7 28.6 75 85.7 100 
Bulgaria 
   
75 75 75 50 50 100 57.1 71.4 75 50 
Cyprus 100 0 100 25 100 
 
75 0 66.7 25 50 0 66.7 
Czech Republic 40 100 100 100 66.7 60 50 75 100 75 0 75 100 
Denmark 
 
100 100 100 100 50 100 
 
66.7 83.3 75 100 50 
Estonia 50 0 100 
 
100 100 100 66.7 60 71.4 75 100 100 
Finland 66.7 57.1 42.9 60 100 50 60 100 50 75 40 0 0 
France 33.3 40 100 100 85.7 80 85.7 66.7 71.4 83.3 50 33.3 100 
Germany 75 71.4 100 100 100 80 75 50 75 80 50 0 66.7 
Greece 100 25 25 50 40 100 33.3 25 57.1 40 83.3 75 50 
Hungary 66.7 50 50 50 100 80 66.7 66.7 60 80 100 100 100 
Ireland 33.3 66.7 100 0 80 40 25 40 66.7 100 75 100 75 
Italy 66.7 60 80 80 25 33.3 50 100 57.1 50 80 66.7 100 
Latvia 
 
0 60 60 50 100 60 50 60 100 100 100 100 
Lithuania 0 50 100 33.3 50 83.3 50 80 100 83.3 60 66.7 50 
Luxembourg 100 33.3 75 100 66.7 100 100 50 
 
50 83.3 50 
 Malta 
  
0 0 60 66.7 0 66.7 33.3 75 50 50 0 
Netherlands 100 50 100 100 85.7 75 50 83.3 0 75 100 0 100 
Poland 100 0 85.7 75 62.5 66.7 100 60 
 
75 33.3 100 50 
Portugal 50 50 100 40 50 50 50 85.7 100 75 60 100 
 Romania 
   
25 66.7 66.7 28.6 25 100 33.3 100 87.5 
 Slovakia 100 0 50 66.7 83.3 50 50 50 100 100 66.7 71.4 50 
Slovenia 100 50 50 50 100 66.7 100 75 
 
75 50 50 0 
Spain 60 57.1 57.1 57.1 83.3 42.9 75 71.4 50 50 80 100 0 
Sweden 83.3 100 50 100 75 50 83.3 71.4 100 60 50 66.7 
 United Kingdom 100 66.7 100 50 60 50 0 20 75 83.3 50 100 
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Table A9B: SNpoldomR index: Share of policy domains affected by at least one labour market reform reducing flexibility (“negative” 
reform) out of those reformed, by year of implementation and country 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 42.9 33.3 85.7 0 80 50 50 50 57.1 40 50 40 0 
Belgium 50 33.3 50 60 40 60 100 33.3 33.3 71.4 50 28.6 0 
Bulgaria 
   
50 75 50 50 50 0 71.4 71.4 50 50 
Cyprus 0 100 0 75 0 
 
25 100 33.3 75 50 100 33.3 
Czech Republic 80 33.3  100 0 83.3 40 50 75 25 25 100 25 50 
Denmark 
 
100 33.3 50 25 100 0 
 
50 33.3 25 0 50 
Estonia 50 100 0 
 
0 0 0 33.3 20 71.4 25 50 0 
Finland 33.3 28.6 57.1 40 20 50 40 0 50 25 80 100 100 
France 66.7 60 25 0 57.1 60 14.3 33.3 28.6 33.3 75 66.7 0 
Germany 25 42.9 0 20 0 20 25 50 50 40 50 100 66.7 
Greece 0 50 75 50 60 0 66.7 50 57.1 60 50 50 50 
Hungary 33.3 50 50 50 0 20 100 50 40 60 25 42.9 100 
Ireland 66.7 66.7 0 100 20 60 50 60 0 40 25 0 75 
Italy 66.7 40 60 40 75 83.3 50 60 57.1 75 60 50 100 
Latvia 
 
100 40 20 50 50 60 50 60 33.3 66.7 0 0 
Lithuania 50 0 0 50 50 16.7 50 20 50 50 40 50 50 
Luxembourg 100 66.7 25 0 33.3 33.3 0 50 
 
50 33.3 100 
 Malta 
 
1 0 100 60 0 100 33.3 66.7 50 50 50 100 
Netherlands 0 50 0 0 42.9 25 83.3 33.3 100 25 33.3 100 0 
Poland 0 100 14.3 50 50 66.7 0 40 
 
75 100 66.7 100 
Portugal 50 50 50 60 50 50 25 57.1 0 75 40 0 
 Romania 
   
75 33.3 50 71.4 75 50 66.7 25 25 
 Slovakia 0 0 75 33.3 16.7 50 100 66.7 0 25 33.3 57.1 100 
Slovenia 0 50 50 50 0 33.3 0 75 
 
25 50 50 100 
Spain 40 85.7 57.1 42.9 16.7 71.4 37.5 57.1 50 50 60 57.1 75 
Sweden 16.7 33.3 50 0 0 50 50 28.6 0 40 50 33.3 
 United Kingdom 0 0 100 75 60 50 100 80 25 66.7 50 40 
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Table A10: SpolfieldR index: Share of policy fields affected by at least one labour market reform by year of implementation and country 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 25 6.3 22.9 14.6 12.5 12.5 8.3 8.3 27.1 18.8 12.5 16.7 2.1 
Belgium 16.7 14.6 22.9 16.7 16.7 18.8 12.5 16.7 20.8 27.1 18.8 14.6 16.7 
Bulgaria 
   
14.6 18.8 14.6 14.6 20.8 12.5 29.2 29.2 14.6 4.2 
Cyprus 2.1 2.1 2.1 12.5 4.2 
 
12.5 4.2 6.3 16.7 8.3 8.3 6.3 
Czech Republic 14.6 12.5 4.2 4.2 29.2 12.5 6.3 12.5 14.6 16.7 2.1 14.6 14.6 
Denmark 
 
4.2 10.4 10.4 16.7 4.2 6.3 
 
18.8 12.5 8.3 2.1 8.3 
Estonia 4.2 2.1 2.1 
 
10.4 6.3 2.1 6.3 12.5 37.5 10.4 6.3 6.3 
Finland 16.7 18.8 22.9 12.5 22.9 12.5 12.5 6.3 18.8 16.7 22.9 6.3 2.1 
France 6.3 10.4 10.4 6.3 22.9 27.1 22.9 18.8 18.8 27.1 14.6 16.7 2.1 
Germany 8.3 18.8 8.3 22.9 14.6 12.5 8.3 10.4 18.8 22.9 10.4 4.2 12.5 
Greece 2.1 18.8 10.4 6.3 14.6 6.3 6.3 8.3 25 16.7 31.3 18.8 6.3 
Hungary 6.3 4.2 4.2 10.4 12.5 18.8 18.8 18.8 12.5 20.8 16.7 37.5 2.1 
Ireland 16.7 10.4 4.2 2.1 12.5 12.5 16.7 12.5 8.3 18.8 16.7 6.3 14.6 
Italy 10.4 14.6 18.8 22.9 10.4 14.6 6.3 25 31.3 8.3 20.8 22.9 2.1 
Latvia 
 
2.1 16.7 16.7 14.6 8.3 22.9 10.4 18.8 12.5 12.5 12.5 4.2 
Lithuania 6.3 4.2 2.1 20.8 16.7 14.6 10.4 18.8 6.3 25 20.8 22.9 14.6 
Luxembourg 4.2 6.3 10.4 2.1 8.3 14.6 4.2 12.5 
 
16.7 18.8 4.2 
 Malta 
  
8.3 4.2 18.8 10.4 2.1 8.3 20.8 14.6 8.3 4.2 2.1 
Netherlands 6.3 12.5 8.3 4.2 18.8 10.4 20.8 25 2.1 16.7 10.4 2.1 2.1 
Poland 6.3 2.1 18.8 16.7 33.3 6.3 4.2 20.8 
 
16.7 8.3 10.4 6.3 
Portugal 6.3 8.3 6.3 12.5 18.8 8.3 10.4 27.1 8.3 52.1 18.8 12.5 
 Romania 
   
14.6 8.3 22.9 16.7 8.3 6.3 18.8 10.4 33.3 
 Slovakia 4.2 2.1 10.4 12.5 16.7 8.3 6.3 22.9 2.1 18.8 8.3 31.3 4.2 
Slovenia 2.1 4.2 4.2 6.3 8.3 8.3 2.1 16.7 
 
16.7 8.3 12.5 2.1 
Spain 14.6 25 27.1 20.8 16.7 22.9 31.3 25 12.5 14.6 22.9 31.3 8.3 
Sweden 14.6 8.3 12.5 10.4 10.4 16.7 25 25 16.7 20.8 16.7 8.3 
 United Kingdom 6.3 6.3 4.2 20.8 20.8 4.2 2.1 16.7 12.5 33.3 14.6 25 
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Table A11A: SPpolfieldR index Share of policy fields affected by at least one labour market reform enhancing flexibility (“positive” 
reform) out of those reformed by year of implementation and country 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 66.7 66.7 45.5 100 33.3 66.7 50 50 53.8 66.7 66.7 62.5 100 
Belgium 62.5 71.4 54.5 62.5 62.5 66.7 50 75 60 46.2 77.8 71.4 100 
Bulgaria 
   
57.1 44.4 71.4 57.1 60 100 42.9 71.4 42.9 50 
Cyprus 100 0 100 16.7 100 
 
66.7 0 66.7 50 50 0 66.7 
Czech Republic 42.9 50 50 100 50 66.7 66.7 50 71.4 87.5 0 71.4 85.7 
Denmark 
 
50 80 80 75 50 100 
 
66.7 83.3 75 100 50 
Estonia 50 0 100 
 
100 66.7 100 66.7 50 61.1 80 100 100 
Finland 75 44.4 54.5 50 100 66.7 66.7 100 55.6 87.5 45.5 0 0 
France 33.3 40 80 100 72.7 76.9 90.9 66.7 77.8 76.9 57.1 50 100 
Germany 75 66.7 100 90.9 100 83.3 75 60 77.8 72.7 60 0 66.7 
Greece 100 22.2 40 66.7 42.9 100 33.3 25 58.3 37.5 86.7 55.6 33.3 
Hungary 66.7 50 50 60 100 88.9 33.3 44.4 66.7 80 87.5 83.3 100 
Ireland 37.5 60 100 0 83.3 50 50 50 75 77.8 75 100 57.1 
Italy 60 57.1 66.7 45.5 20 28.6 33.3 66.7 40 25 80 72.7 100 
Latvia 
 
0 37.5 37.5 57.1 75 63.6 60 66.7 66.7 83.3 100 100 
Lithuania 0 50 100 30 37.5 71.4 60 66.7 66.7 58.3 60 45.5 42.9 
Luxembourg 50 33.3 80 100 75 85.7 100 50 
 
62.5 66.7 50 
 Malta 
  
0 0 66.7 80 0 75 60 57.1 50 50 0 
Netherlands 100 50 100 100 66.7 80 50 83.3 0 75 80 0 100 
Poland 100 0 88.9 75 50 66.7 100 70 
 
75 25 60 33.3 
Portugal 33.3 50 66.7 33.3 55.6 25 60 69.2 100 72 66.7 100 
 Romania 
   
28.6 75 72.7 25 25 100 44.4 80 87.5 
 Slovakia 100 0 40 83.3 62.5 50 33.3 27.3 100 77.8 75 73.3 50 
Slovenia 100 50 50 66.7 100 75 100 62.5 
 
75 50 33.3 0 
Spain 71.4 41.7 61.5 70 87.5 36.4 73.3 66.7 66.7 71.4 72.7 80 0 
Sweden 85.7 75 66.7 100 80 50 75 83.3 100 80 50 75 
 United Kingdom 100 66.7 50 30 60 50 0 37.5 83.3 56.3 71.4 75 
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Table A11B: SNpolfieldR index Share of policy fields affected by at least one labour market reform reducing flexibility (“negative” reform) 
out of those reformed by year of implementation and country 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 33.3 33.3 63.6 0 66.7 33.3 50 50 38.5 33.3 33.3 37.5 0 
Belgium 37.5 28.6 45.5 37.5 37.5 33.3 66.7 25 40 53.8 22.2 28.6 0 
Bulgaria 
   
28.6 55.6 28.6 42.9 40 0 57.1 35.7 57.1 50 
Cyprus 0 100 0 83.3 0 
 
33.3 100 33.3 50 25 100 33.3 
Czech Republic 71.4 50 50 0 57.1 33.3 33.3 50 14.3 12.5 100 28.6 14.3 
Denmark 
 
50 20 20 12.5 100 0 
 
33.3 16.7 25 0 50 
Estonia 50 100 0 
 
0 0 0 33.3 33.3 44.4 20 0 0 
Finland 25 44.4 45.5 50 9.1 33.3 33.3 0 44.4 12.5 54.5 100 100 
France 66.7 60 20 0 36.4 23.1 9.1 22.2 22.2 30.8 42.9 50 0 
Germany 25 33.3 0 9.1 0 16.7 25 40 22.2 36.4 40 100 50 
Greece 0 55.6 60 33.3 57.1 0 66.7 50 41.7 62.5 40 55.6 66.7 
Hungary 33.3 50 50 40 0 11.1 66.7 55.6 33.3 40 37.5 22.2 100 
Ireland 50 40 0 100 16.7 50 37.5 50 0 33.3 12.5 0 57.1 
Italy 40 42.9 44.4 36.4 80 85.7 66.7 41.7 60 75 40 27.3 100 
Latvia 
 
100 62.5 25 42.9 25 36.4 40 44.4 50 33.3 0 0 
Lithuania 66.7 0 0 60 50 14.3 40 11.1 33.3 33.3 40 54.5 57.1 
Luxembourg 50 66.7 20 0 25 14.3 0 50 
 
37.5 33.3 100 
 Malta 
 
1 0 100 33.3 0 100 25 40 28.6 50 50 100 
Netherlands 0 50 0 0 33.3 20 70 16.7 100 25 20 100 0 
Poland 0 100 11.1 25 50 33.3 0 30 
 
37.5 100 40 66.7 
Portugal 33.3 50 33.3 66.7 33.3 50 20 38.5 0 44 22.2 0 
 Romania 
   
71.4 25 27.3 75 75 33.3 55.6 40 18.8 
 Slovakia 0 0 60 16.7 12.5 50 66.7 72.7 0 22.2 25 33.3 100 
Slovenia 0 50 50 33.3 0 25 0 37.5 
 
25 50 66.7 100 
Spain 28.6 66.7 38.5 30 12.5 63.6 33.3 33.3 33.3 28.6 27.3 26.7 75 
Sweden 14.3 25 33.3 0 0 50 33.3 16.7 0 20 37.5 25 
 United Kingdom 0 0 50 70 40 50 100 62.5 16.7 43.8 28.6 33.3 
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Table A12: R&D tax subsidy rates (1-Bindex) 
 L1990 L1995 L1999 S1999 L2001 S2001 L2004 S2004 L2006 S2006 L2008 S2008 LP2012 SP2012 LP2013 SP2013 LL2013 SL2013 
Austria 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
Belgium -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 
Czech Republic - - - - - - - - 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.15 
Denmark 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.29 0.29 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Finland -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.28 0.28 0.22 0.22 
France 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.19 0.37 0.37 0.34 0.43 0.28 0.51 0.23 0.51 
Germany -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Greece - - -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 - - - - - - 
Hungary - - - - - - 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.22 0.22 0.33 0.33 0.16 0.16 
Ireland 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.13 0.29 0.29 0.23 0.23 
Italy -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.45 -0.03 0.44 -0.03 0.45 -0.02 0.43 -0.02 -0.02 - - - - - - 
Luxembourg - - - - - - - - - - -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Netherlands -0.02 0.05 0.05 - 0.06 0.22 0.07 0.24 0.07 0.24 0.07 0.24 0.14 0.33 0.14 0.34 0.13 0.32 
Poland - - - - - - - - 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Portugal -0.02 -0.02 0.15 0.15 0.30 0.30 -0.01 -0.01 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.41 0.41 0.49 0.62 0.38 0.48 
Slovakia - - - - - - - - - - -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Slovenia - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.05 0.05 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.14 
Spain 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.39 0.39 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.30 0.30 
Sweden -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
United Kingdom 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.19 0.11 0.28 0.08 0.28 0.06 0.28 
L Large firms (all) 
S SME firms (all) 
LP Large profit making firms 
LL Large loss making firms 
SP SME profit making firms 
SL SME loss making firms 
 
50 
List of figures 
Figure 1: Total number of labour market reforms in EU 
Countries (2000-2012) ....................................................................... 9 
Figure 2: OECD Indicator of Employment Protection in 1999 ................................. 9 
Figure 3: Total number of labour market reforms by year 
(2000-2012) ................................................................................... 10 
Figure 4: Average number of labour policy domains (out of 9) 
and of policy fields (out of 48) affected by reforms 
by country ...................................................................................... 11 
Figure 5: Share of labour market reforms that cannot be 
classified as “positive” or “negative” by country 
(values in %) .................................................................................. 12 
Figure 6: Total number of reforms increasing labour market 
flexibility (“positive” reforms) in European Union 
Countries (2000-2012) ..................................................................... 13 
Figure 7: Total number of reforms decreasing labour market 
flexibility (“negative” reforms) in European Union 
Countries (2000-2012) ..................................................................... 13 
Figure 8: Yearly average number of policy domains (out of 9) 
affected by “positive” and “negative” reforms...................................... 14 
Figure 9: Yearly average number of policy fields (out of 48) 
affected by “positive” and “negative” reforms...................................... 14 
Figure 10: Extension and direction of labour market reforming 
processes ....................................................................................... 18 
Figure 11: Number of “positive” and “negative” reforms in all 
EU countries by policy domain 2000-2012 .......................................... 19 
Figure 12: R&D Tax Subsidy Rate on Large firms in 2001, 2006 
and 2012 ........................................................................................ 26 
Figure 13: R&D Tax Subsidy Rate on SME firms in 2001, 2006 
and 2012 ........................................................................................ 26 
Figure 14: Number of procedures needed to start a business ................................ 29 
Figure 15: Number of days needed to start a business ......................................... 29 
Figure 16: Number of procedures needed to enforce a contract ............................ 30 
Figure 17: Number of days needed to enforce a contract ..................................... 30 
  
51 
List of tables  
Table 1:  Topics covered by FRdB-IZA Social Reforms 
database by policy area ...................................................................... 6 
Table 2:  Fields covered by LABREF database by Policy 
Domains ........................................................................................... 7 
Table 3:  Direction of the reforms ................................................................... 11 
Table 4:  Labour market reforms implemented by all EU 
countries (2000-2012) and their directions ......................................... 12 
Table 5:  Synthetic indexes on labour market reforms in EU 
countries – Average 2000-2012 ........................................................ 17 
Table 6:  Share of reforms by policy domain ..................................................... 20 
Table 7:  Share of “positive” reforms by policy domain ...................................... 21 
Table 8:  Share of “negative” reforms by policy domain ..................................... 21 
Table 9:  TSRs data source............................................................................. 24 
Table 10:  EU countries and years covered by the B-index ................................... 25 
Table 11:  Topics and indicators covered by the DoingBusiness 
report ............................................................................................ 27 
 
Table A1:  Number of measures concerning labour market by 
year of implementation and country ................................................... 32 
Table A2:  Number of policy domains (out of 9) affected by 
reforms by year of implementation and country .................................. 33 
Table A3  Number of policy fields (out of 48) affected by 
reforms by year of implementation and country .................................. 34 
Table A4A:  Amount of reforms enhancing labour market 
flexibility (i.e. “positive” reforms) by year of 
implementation and country ............................................................. 35 
Table A4B:  Amount of reforms reducing labour market flexibility 
(i.e. “negative” reforms) by year of implementation 
and country .................................................................................... 36 
Table A5A:  Amount of policy domains (out of 9) affected by at 
least one reform enhancing labour market flexibility 
(i.e. “positive” reforms) by year of implementation 
and country .................................................................................... 37 
Table A5B:  Amount of policy domains (out of 9) affected by at 
least one reform reducing labour market flexibility 
(i.e. “negative” reforms) by year of implementation 
and country .................................................................................... 38 
Table A6A:  Amount of policy fields (out of 48) affected by at 
least one reform enhancing labour market flexibility 
(i.e. “positive” reforms) by year of implementation 
and country .................................................................................... 39 
Table A6B:  Amount of policy fields (out of 48) affected by at 
least one reform reducing labour market flexibility 
(i.e. “negative” reforms) by year of implementation 
and country .................................................................................... 40 
52 
Table A7A: SRP index: Share of reforms enhancing labour 
market flexibility (“positive” reforms) by year of 
implementation and country ............................................................. 41 
Table A7B: SRN index: Share of reforms reducing labour market 
flexibility (“negative” reforms) by year of 
implementation and country ............................................................. 42 
Table A8: SpoldomR index: Share of policy domains affected 
by at least one labour market reform by year of 
implementation and country ............................................................. 43 
Table A9A: SPpoldomR index: Share of policy domains affected 
by at least one labour market reform enhancing 
flexibility (“positive” reform) out of those reformed, 
by year of implementation and country .............................................. 44 
Table A9B: SNpoldomR index: Share of policy domains affected 
by at least one labour market reform reducing 
flexibility (“negative” reform) out of those reformed, 
by year of implementation and country .............................................. 45 
Table A10: SpolfieldR index: Share of policy fields affected by at 
least one labour market reform by year of 
implementation and country ............................................................. 46 
Table A11A:  SPpolfieldR index Share of policy fields affected by at 
least one labour market reform enhancing flexibility 
(“positive” reform) out of those reformed by year of 
implementation and country ............................................................. 47 
Table A11B:  SNpolfieldR index Share of policy fields affected by 
at least one labour market reform reducing flexibility 
(“negative” reform) out of those reformed by year of 
implementation and country ............................................................. 48 
Table A12: R&D tax subsidy rates (1-Bindex) ...................................................... 49 
How to obtain EU publications 
Our publications are available from EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu), 
where you can place an order with the sales agent of your choice. 
The Publications Office has a worldwide network of sales agents. 
You can obtain their contact details by sending a fax to (352) 29 29-42758 
Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European 
Union 
Free phone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(*) Certain mobile telephone operators do not allow access to 00 800 numbers or these 
calls may be billed. 
A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet. 
It can be accessed through the Europa server http://europa.eu
2 
doi:10.2791/634906 
ISBN 978-92-79-58530-2 
L
F
-N
A
-2
7
9
3
2
-E
N
-N
 
JRC Mission 
As the Commission’s  
in-house science service,  
the Joint Research Centre’s 
mission is to provide EU  
policies with independent,  
evidence-based scientific  
and technical support  
throughout the whole  
policy cycle. 
Working in close  
cooperation with policy  
Directorates-General,  
the JRC addresses key  
societal challenges while  
stimulating innovation  
through developing  
new methods, tools  
and standards, and sharing 
its know-how with  
the Member States,  
the scientific community  
and international partners. 
Serving society  
Stimulating innovation 
Supporting legislation 
